Teaching Bodies: Curriculum and Corporeality by Maudlin, Julie Garlen
Georgia Southern University 
Digital Commons@Georgia Southern 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies, Jack N. Averitt College of 
Spring 2006 
Teaching Bodies: Curriculum and Corporeality 
Julie Garlen Maudlin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Maudlin, Julie Garlen, "Teaching Bodies: Curriculum and Corporeality" (2006). Electronic 
Theses and Dissertations. 469. 
https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd/469 
This dissertation (open access) is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies, 
Jack N. Averitt College of at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital 
Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact 
digitalcommons@georgiasouthern.edu. 
  1 
TEACHING BODIES:  CURRICULUM AND CORPOREALITY 
by 
JULIE GARLEN MAUDLIN 
(Under the Direction of John A. Weaver) 
ABSTRACT 
I began thinking about the topic of this dissertation at first in 2003 when I found 
myself expecting a third child while teaching full-time and pursuing a doctoral degree, 
and in earnest later that year at Bergamo, where I began to see a connection between my 
own interest in desires and bodies as they relate to education and the work of several of 
my colleagues.  I began to think about the role of the body in the curriculum.  Everyday 
that we enter the classroom we bring our bodies and our desires along with us. We 
educate and learn from gestating bodies, ill bodies, able and “dis”-abled bodies, bodies 
that shape who we are as students and teachers.  And yet, it seems that in many ways, the 
body becomes unimportant, if not invisible, in the traditional classroom.  
   What I hope to accomplish with this dissertation, then, is to examine what I 
perceive as the disembodiment of curriculum, and bring the body into the educational 
practice and discourse in a way that is meaningful to the everyday practice of teachers 
and relevant to the future of curriculum at large.  This project is not an attempt to 
reconceptualize physical education, although the binary we have constructed between 
kinesthetic and academic education is relevant.  This study is also not a rearticulation of 
kinesthetic learning theory; the decision to utilize bodily movement as a way of helping 
students internalize concepts might be considered an initiative to involve the body more 
in the curriculum, but this study is more about what we do to, and from, and in our bodies 
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than with them.  I want to understand in what ways the body and pedagogy are 
intertwined, to explore how the ways we have thought about the body have shaped how 
we are as students and teachers, and to imagine an “embodied” curriculum that reflects 
the ways that the postmodern, posthuman body and the curriculum act with/in, on and 
against one another.   
 
 
INDEX WORDS: Curriculum, Corporeality, Teaching, Body, Text, Education. 
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CHAPTER 1 
WRITING ON THE BODY 
 
What About the Body? 
Why write about the body?  One might wonder what brings a student of 
curriculum studies, pursuing not an M.D. but a doctorate in education, to study the 
relationship between curriculum and the body. Pinar et. al (1995) have suggested that 
scholars choose their research topics with “the promise of excitement not of prudence” 
and it was indeed this promise, this stirring that grew out of my own bodily experiences 
that led me to this study (p. 868).   This dissertation is about bodies; it is about a space 
where paradigms, bodies of knowledge, merge with the material bodies of teachers and 
students.  It began when, in my last semester of doctoral coursework and my second year 
of teaching fourth and fifth graders at a non-traditional state-funded public charter school, 
I found myself expecting a third child.  In the months leading up to that unexpected 
discovery, I had been plagued with intense headaches and bouts of overwhelming despair 
with each approaching menstrual cycle.  I had never before experienced that kind of 
instability, an overpowering sense that my world was suddenly spinning out of control. 
Desperate to understand what I was experiencing, my husband probed me for some 
explanation.  The only description that I could come up with was that I wanted to “paint 
the world black.”    When these episodes occurred, not only was I not able to teach, but 
all I could do was retreat to my dark bedroom until the symptoms disappeared.  In an 
effort to diagnose the cause of the problem, my obstetrician suggested I discontinue my 
oral contraceptives, and, in spite of alternative measures, it was only a matter of weeks 
before my old symptoms vanished and new ones appeared.   
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 When I discovered that I would be adding another child to the three and five year 
olds I was already raising while teaching full-time and pursuing a doctoral degree, I faced 
several dilemmas, but after I had considered the exhausting logistics of adding gestating 
to my already lengthy Things To Do list, I started thinking about how this pregnancy, 
brought forth out of my own attempts to control my body’s hormonal spiral, would 
impact me as a teacher and a researcher.  How would I tell my nine and ten year old 
students that I was pregnant, and what would they think?  How would I cope with the 
constant display of this incredibly public product of my sexuality?  The pregnancy would 
change the way I felt, looked, and even thought.  How would those changes be felt by my 
students?  In many ways, my new corporeal reality called into question the performative, 
poststructural theory that had resonated so strongly with me as I wondered how to 
reconcile what I perceived as conflicting identities. 
 That year at Bergamo, the annual conference of the Journal of Curriculum 
Theorizing (JCT), I probed these issues further with a paper titled, “Where is the Love?,” 
in which I explored the discourses of desire as they relate to education. As I sat in on the 
sessions of several of my colleagues that year, I heard one story after another that 
resonated with thoughts about education and the body:  Marla Morris spoke about 
teaching through the ill body, Delease Wear talked about compassion in medical 
education, and Leigh Medders shared her personal experience of watching her young 
niece battle cancer.  The more I heard, read, and talked about the body, the more I wanted 
to explore its impact on education and its role in shaping curriculum. 
 My curiosity intensified a few months after the birth of my son, John Stokes, 
when I began my new job as a fourth grade teacher in a rural public elementary school.  I 
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was still feeling a little out of place in my new traditional setting when my homeroom 
students began to arrive with their parents for Open House.  I was taken aback when one 
parent after another greeted me with an explanation of the medications their child took 
for attention deficit disorders.  Eventually, I found out that seven (a full twenty-five 
percent) of the 26 homeroom students I would teach the last half of the school day had 
been diagnosed with attention deficit conditions.  Two of those students had also been 
diagnosed with additional conditions, including oppositional defiant disorder.  Having 
only worked with a few medicated students in my two years teaching in a university town 
only a hundred miles away, I had not anticipated this change, which fueled my thoughts 
about how the body has interacted with the curriculum.  Working with these students 
brought new questions to mind, as I couldn’t help feeling that their bodies had something 
to say about the state of education.  What is it exactly that we are treating? What are our 
bodies trying to tell us about the ways that we have attempted to train them into 
submission? 
 One additional classroom experience contributed to the shaping of this 
dissertation just as I was attempting to organize my proposal.  I found myself in the 
middle of a paradigm shift in the way that education has approached students with 
disabilities.  Suddenly, “inclusion” had emerged anew from the 1980s as the “new” 
buzzword, and both special education and regular education teachers were scrambling to 
adjust to this new mindset.  As I attended workshops to learn how to serve the needs of 
students with disabilities without “resourcing” them to a special education classroom, I 
began to think about how the students had come to be excluded in the first place.  I 
wondered how our ideas about disabled bodies, bodies that some might refer to as 
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“abnormal,” have shaped educational practice?  I began to suspect that there might be 
more to the traditional exclusion model of educating disabled students than mere 
logistics.     
 Finally, I cannot omit one final experience that further ignited my thoughts as I 
was writing.  In the fall of 2005, the health of my 89 year-old maternal grandfather, 
Stokes, began a slow but steady decline.  He had been struggling with Parkinson’s for 
more than a decade, and as I anticipated his looming death, I reflected on the way that our 
assumptions about illness and the body had constructed the last years of his life.  
Although he never explicitly discussed his illness, I knew that this proud, stern man who 
had for so long maintained such a tight rein on his actions and emotions, was ashamed of 
the bodily impulses that eventually left him virtually helpless.  He took his last breath on 
Christmas Eve morning, and his death left me with all kinds of questions about bodies, 
and control, and stories, and illness.  
 All of these questions lead to the underlying theme of this dissertation, the role 
theories of the body and the body itself has had in shaping curriculum, and conversely, 
the role curriculum has had in shaping the body.  To understand these interconnections, 
we as educators and students must recognize the ways we act on, in, and through the 
body.  As O’Farrell et al (2000) observes, “The body is trained, shaped and toned to 
perfect tautness in minute detail at every turn and under every circumstance” (p. 1).  
Whether or not we are conscious of it, this training of the body occurs through a wide 
variety of educational practices, including those discussed here: standardized testing, the 
overuse of textbooks, and popular culture, among others.   
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Recently, academia has seen an upsurge of interest in what Rosemarie Garland-
Thompson (2003) calls “body criticism.”  However, many critical studies fail to bridge 
the gap between the discursive and the material, and “overlook particular bodies 
embedded in specific situations” (Garland-Thompson, 2003).  As Kathy Davis (1997) 
notes, “The body may be back but the new body theory is just as . . .disembodied as it 
ever was” (18).  Thus, this dissertation seeks to answer the question, “What about the 
body?”  Can the material body exist in the discursive complexities of postmodernism, and 
if so, where, and how? 
As I began looking for insight into that question, I looked not to my own 
embodied experiences but to text.  Instead of first asking, “What about my body?” I 
began reading everything I could find about theories of the body and embodiment.  I 
knew when this project had begun for me, but I found myself at a loss when it came to 
articulating exactly what I was hoping to express in my writing.  Having become so 
accustomed, as a product of a traditional text-based education, to remanding myself to 
text, it did not occur to me to begin my inquiry by first looking inward.  Somewhere in 
the early stages of my dissertation, however, I came across Donna LeCourt’s (2004) 
opening to Identity matters: schooling the student body in academic discourse.  She said 
that her book 
began in stories of failure and frustration, from an attempt to better understand 
what was taking place in my classrooms and why I was so invested in the 
pedagogies that kept failing me.  From practice, I was led to theory, but theory 
does not begin in the academy; it begins in everyday interactions and reactions. It 
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begins in autobiography.  It becomes a search for understanding that everyday 
realities or accepted ways of thinking cannot explain (p. 1). 
When I read those words that I knew I must rethink the way that I was going about my 
own “body project.”  I understood then that if I hoped to articulate a sense of thinking 
about education through, and with, and in the body, I must begin by thinking through my 
own muddled perceptions of what it means to live from the body.   
My Body Autobiography 
After that initial realization, I thought for a long time about when and how I began 
to think about my body, and eventually the memories began to resurface.  One of the first 
things I can remember is that I disliked the word “nose.”  When I was three years old, I 
was taking our Bassett Hound, Hushpuppy, down the front steps when I became 
entangled in the leash and fell face-first on the hard brick.  Fearing my nose might be 
broken, my parents took me to the emergency room, and I remember feeling mortified at 
having to lie on the table and have x-rays taken of my body and particularly my nose, 
which I felt was private. Fortunately, there were no broken bones, but that experience 
was implanted permanently in my memory. 
I must have been about five when I started to wonder if I might be fat.  It was 
sometime after we moved back to the small South Georgia town where my mother had 
grown up.  She was in her early thirties then; she was thin and had long chestnut colored 
hair.  I admired her; she was tall and beautiful and seemed to wear a smile everywhere we 
went.  I remember waiting for her to finish her workouts at the Shape Shop, where all the 
women seemed equally fit and trim.  My dad was also tall and handsome with his dark 
features and slim build.  I thought he looked like Tom Selleck, who was starring in 
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Magnum P.I. then.  I remember shopping in health food stores, eating carob chip cookies, 
the pantries full of muscle shakes and diet supplements.  
I was five when Return of the Jedi opened, and when we went to see it in the 
theater, I left with Carrie Fisher’s image permanently imprinted in my mind.  She was 
everything I hoped to become: smart, strong, and of course, impossibly skinny.  
Somewhere during this time, I began to think differently about my body, comparing 
myself to the images that circulated in my consciousness. Once I started kindergarten, I 
was fitted with glasses, and suddenly I found myself very conscious of being different 
from my friends.  My sister, gangly and four years my senior, was just beginning an 
awkward pre-adolescent stage, and she was struggling to make friends in a new school.  I 
don’t remember ever consciously committing myself to being like the “in-crowd,” but I 
had an intense desire to be liked, to escape the hurt and pain I saw in my sister’s eyes. 
I was probably about nine when I started to think about dieting.  We have an old 
home video in which I am the first to proclaim proudly after Christmas dinner, “I’m 
going on a diet the first of the year!”  Of course, I sneak back in a few minutes later to 
assure viewers that I am not really going on a diet – I  certainly didn’t want anyone to 
know that I really did think I was fat.  I didn’t think they would understand.  Just before I 
turned ten, I convinced my parents that I was ready for contacts, and I remember feeling 
so relieved that I would no longer have to look like a “nerd.”  Then I developed breasts, 
which at first wasn’t a problem, because bra-wearing had become the new trend for the 
fourth grade girls at my elementary school, although only a few of us actually needed 
one.  But a few months later I started the fifth grade at the middle school where all the 
elementary schools merged. I found myself separated from my old friends, and I quickly 
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gravitated toward the “popular” girls I knew from the other schools, most of whom were 
flat-chested and thin, and I found myself feeling different once again.  I wore tank-tops 
under my clothes all year to avoid having to wear a bra.  It was that year that I most 
remember feeling that I was fat. 
I remember being comforted by food. My father’s mother, who lived just down 
the road from us, was a fantastic cook who equated food with love.  She cooked for us 
because she loved us, and if you wanted her to know that you loved her, you’d better eat. 
With both sets of grandparents in town, we were always coming together to eat on 
Sundays, holidays, and birthdays, and huge Saturday morning breakfasts complete with 
biscuits, gravy, potatoes, ham, bacon and Coca-Cola were a family tradition.  My 
grandmother had grown up with so little that to her, having a fleshy body was a sign of 
prosperity.  She used to say to me fondly, “You’re pleasantly plump.”   
By seventh grade, I had completely given up on two-piece bathing suits.  My 
breasts had already grown to their adult size, and I was sharing my mom’s 36C bras.  I 
was intensely self-conscious about them. I remember a favorite pink name-brand 
sweatshirt I had bought with my own money that year – my protruding breasts left it 
hanging loosely at my waist and one day a boy asked if I was pregnant.  I was mortified.  
I had never even kissed a boy!  When I started my period in November that year, I was so 
embarrassed by it that I simply borrowed supplies from the bathroom and went to school 
without telling my mom, only to call her crying a few hours later.  I couldn’t come out 
and say what had happened, but she knew. Menstruation was something that was only 
talked about in euphemisms in my family.  I quickly learned that issues of the body, of 
the flesh, whether of loathing or desire, were not something to be discussed. 
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By the time I got to high school, I had almost completely given up on desserts, 
and I progressed from packing my own healthy lunch (I never ate lunchroom food) to 
just drinking Slim-Fast.  Of course, I still splurged now and then, but not without feeling 
guilty.  I started thinking about my body almost all the time.  I wasn’t fat – I weighed 120 
pounds – but that was fifteen or twenty pounds more than many of my friends. I was 
critical of anything I put on, wearing only clothes that I saw as flattering.  I walked, ran, 
played tennis and soccer, and there was little time for eating with a tight schedule of 
honors classes and extracurricular activities.  My body was gradually growing into my 
breasts, but they were still a source of embarrassment for me.  I remember jokingly 
singing “working nine to five” during a soccer practice, and the entire co-ed team 
breaking out into laughter when my coach blurted, “Sing it, Dolly.” 
By the time I started college, I was a few inches taller and just ten pounds heavier, 
but I was headed for diet disaster.  The first two quarters, I showed tremendous restraint 
thanks to the meager grocery budget enforced by my sister, who was my roommate that 
year.  But by spring quarter, I had broken up with my hometown boyfriend of over three 
years and joined a sorority.  Soon, I was enjoying restaurant food and pitchers of beer 
every night. It didn’t take long for me to pack on 20 pounds, and find myself feeling 
completely miserable.  That summer I exercised, worked two jobs, ate one meal a day, 
and quickly lost the weight and then some.  When I got back to school in the fall, my 
sorority sisters went on endlessly about how great I looked.  I remember thinking how 
awful I must have looked before I had lost weight.   
Although I had definitely toyed with the idea of starving myself since I was 
young, my sophomore year of college was the first time that I ever let myself get carried 
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away.  There were weeks when my entire intake consisted of a few small grilled chicken 
breasts.  I would take cold medicine or dexatrim to help stave off the hunger pains.  I was 
involved in one bad relationship after another just when I was in the middle of my first 
earth-shattering philosophy class, and all I wanted to do was starve away the uncertainty. 
Eventually, a friend intervened and I starting eating again, but indulging still remained 
out of the question.  I existed on aerobics and about ten grams of fat a day for the rest of 
the year. 
The next summer I started running, and I eased up on my dietary restrictions a 
little.  A few months later, I started dating the man that would become my husband, and 
through our mutual love of food, relaxed those restrictions a little more.  The next year, 
we got married.  A month later, just after I started my senior year of college, I got 
pregnant with our first child.  I was 21 years old.    
My first pregnancy was a strange experience.  I had grown up with these mixed 
messages about becoming a successful career-woman and being a good mother, but since 
I was just finishing up college, thoughts of a career were still in the background, and I 
was very much caught up in the whole notion of family and motherhood.  I saw the 
pregnancy as an excuse to leave my old life of restraint behind, and I quickly began eight 
months of excessive indulgence. I gained 45 pounds, and although I was aware of how 
large I had become (“great with child,” as one former professor noted), it wasn’t as much 
of an issue for me.   
What was strange about that pregnancy was not so much the way I perceived my 
body, but the way I was perceived by others. Apparently, pregnant women were few and 
far between on college campuses, because I endured constant stares from the other 
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undergraduates as I walked across campus to my “Physical Education for People with 
Disabilities” class.  It was embarrassing to walk across campus because I felt like such a 
spectacle.  Hadn’t they ever seen a pregnant woman before?  Aside from the stares, once 
the pregnancy became visible, I noticed a marked difference in the way I was treated by 
the professors who did not know me before.  They didn’t call on me.  I have always been 
an active participant in class discussions, the one student my professors could count on to 
have something to say about anything, but suddenly it was as if my intellect was being 
completely dismissed.  I had to work to prove myself in order to be included in the 
discussions once again.  The message that I received from that experience was that smart 
people do not have babies at 22. 
Something else happened during this first pregnancy. I became accustomed, 
actually fond of, to the monthly, then bi-monthly, then weekly visits to my obstetrician.  
There was something so oddly comforting about having my body under constant care, 
something so satisfying about feeding and tending my body so ceremoniously, 
religiously.  Although most of the time I couldn’t bear to look at the scale when I was 
being weighed, somehow those frequent examinations helped me to validate my 
temporary and partial disregard for the cultural norms I had measured myself by for so 
long.   
When I became pregnant with our second child at 24, I had already proven myself 
to my graduate school professors, which actually made it harder for me to tell them.  I 
remember agonizing over having to make the announcement to my professors, who were, 
for the most part, male. They had high hopes for me, and I knew that they would, 
however subconsciously, write me off when they discovered I was expecting baby 
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number two. I finished my coursework and completed my oral comprehensive exams 
when I just about five months along, so I escaped having to teach the huge undergraduate 
classes while visibly pregnant, but I still had to endure the feeling that I was letting my 
professors down by choosing another baby over a Ph.D. program.  Chris and I moved 
away from the college complex where we had been living, and I retreated into solitary 
thesis hours to finish out my pregnancy in relative privacy. 
After my son was born, I began running again, finished my thesis, started the 
doctoral program and rediscovered the career-minded theorist that had been buried 
beneath all the layers of maternity dresses and nursing bras.  Throughout most of those 
years, some of my fears about my bodily inadequacies were relieved by the sense that my 
body was not “my own,” that my round belly and lingering fleshy, milk-filled breasts 
were serving a purpose, but once my body felt like mine again, the thoughts (Dexatrim 
dreams, I called them) returned. Running helped – it not only made me feel lean, it 
brought me peace at a time when my mind had begun filling up with the questions that 
stem from theory, and although I was more uncertain than ever about where I was headed 
professionally, my doctoral studies and later my position as a teacher-leader at the charter 
school reaffirmed my sense of self, my sense of being intelligent, strong, well.  Although 
that longing to be thinner, leaner, was always in the back of mind, my body, no longer a 
spectacle, faded into the background for a while. 
 The first two years of the doctoral program were a time of great uncertainty to me.  
I became overwhelmed with possibilities at a time when many of my life’s decisions had 
already been made.  Sometimes the contradictions of being a wife, a mother, and a 
student of curriculum theory were too hard for me to consider, and so I pushed them into 
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the recesses of my mind.  It should come as no surprise that they surfaced in the form of 
depression-ridden migraines, and you know what happens next. 
 My third pregnancy was the least physically complicated and the most mentally 
and emotionally overwhelming.  Before I had offered my body freely to maternity, but 
now I felt betrayed.  I had moved on from those days when the idealism of maternity 
consumed my every thought; I had started to realize the “me” that had been hiding for so 
long behind a desire for normalcy.  Now I was forced to endure a painfully public 
pregnancy as both a teacher and a doctoral student. I knew that I would fall madly in love 
with the baby the minute that I saw him (I am a fool for babies, anyway) and that my 
instincts would take over, but my body spoke the disappointment and fear my lips 
wouldn’t.  Somewhere in the second trimester, the headaches returned and they were 
constant for weeks on end.  By the third trimester, the headaches were replaced by 
frequent low blood-sugar episodes that left my heart racing from the adrenaline and made 
me feel weak and restless.  I managed to defend my proposal somewhere around my 
eighth month, and I thought I would spend the last few weeks of my pregnancy working 
on my dissertation, but instead I just sat at home watching daytime television and feeling 
sorry for myself.   
By the time I was induced at 39 weeks, I was looking forward to being “myself” 
again.  I had lost about 25 of the 30 pounds I had gained just a week after my son was 
born.  I started running again when he was three weeks old.  A few months later, I began 
the new teaching job thirty miles away and found myself dealing with more stress than I 
could have expected. The blood-sugar episodes returned and I started having heart 
palpitations and anxiety attacks.  I lived through that year in a sleepless daze.   
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This year, I started working as a school-based Instructional Coach, so the stress of 
lesson plans and classroom management has been replaced with the stress of school 
improvement plans and curriculum development.  The blood sugar episodes disappeared 
when I left the classroom, and I have been running with more consistency lately, so the 
palpitations have decreased, but the last two years have still held a lot of uncertainty for 
me.  I have left the support of my doctoral program colleagues, having moved back home 
just before the baby came, and now I am left to contemplate where I am headed once this 
dissertation is defended and bound.   
I have been thinking about my body a lot more in these two years since I gave 
birth to John Stokes.  I weigh myself every single day.  I run to find clarity, but I still find 
myself feeling that I can’t be thin enough to satisfy the uncertainty I felt as my 30th 
birthday approached and quickly faded into memory. Often, my obsessive thoughts have 
even kept me from writing this dissertation, leading me to spend precious hours planning 
and replanning my next diet and exercise plan instead.  Even as I write to hopefully 
understand my own body beyond the discursive fiction it has become, I have become 
more steeped in my compulsive corporeality.  It is such a constant theme for me that I 
know it must impact what I do and say, how I perform my role as mother, teacher, 
student, leader.  At one point when I had committed myself to writing away every semi-
quiet moment I could find, I became so completely immersed in this text that the 
discourse became nearly overwhelming, and its weight first gripped my throat like a vice 
and then settled into my bones. I went on this way for weeks, knowing that articulating 
these thoughts and casting them into the ether of academic discourse was the only way to 
dispel the immensity.  And so, I am still steeped in questions of the body, of my body, of 
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the bodies of teachers and students, of the physical realities of “particular bodies in 
specific situations,” of teaching bodies. 
The Body in Theory 
Exploring my own body autobiography helps explain where this study originates 
for me and allows me to situate my body within the complex framework of academic 
discourse.  As a woman, a mother, someone whose physical body consumes my thoughts, 
I understand that for me, disembodied theory, complete detachment from my body, isn’t a 
possibility.  I understand that my popular-culture mediated reality and my confusions 
about what it means to be “an intellectual” have left me feeling distant and detached from 
any embodied reality.  Thus, this question, “What about the body?,” is one that is of 
particularly importance to me, but I hope to bring to light here why it is also a question of 
great significance for other educators and curriculum theorists.  
While I will argue that the body (material, discursive, or otherwise) is largely 
absent from the school curriculum, it is not to say that it hasn’t been a popular topic of 
academic discourse. On the contrary, the body has been discussed in a number of ways: 
“the discourse of the disruptive, transgressive body (erotics); . . . the discourse of the 
disciplined, governed body (Foucault’s concern with technologies of the self or 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus); and . . . the discourse of the machine (the cyborgian 
body)” (Mission and Morgan, 2000, p. 92). Indeed, discussions have proliferated 
concerning the absent body, the regulated and docile body, the gendered body, and the 
classed, sexed and raced body.  Peter McLaren (1988) expands on these discourses to 
provide some ways that the “body” has been defined: “The term “body” is a promiscuous 
term that ranges wildly from being understood as a warehouse of archaic instinctual 
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drives, to a cauldron of seething libidinal impulses, to a phallocentric economy waging 
war on women, to a lump of perishable matter, to a fiction of discourse.” (p. 57).  As 
these descriptions illustrate, the body has been important in our attempts to recognize 
how and where we are situated in these various discourses, and has become particularly 
significant in recent years not only in feminist and postmodern theories, but, as Pillow 
(2000) notes, “also more broadly in social theory as a place from which to theorize, 
analyze, practice and critically reconsider the construction and reproduction of 
knowledge, power, class and culture” (p. 199).  
Discussions of if, and how, and where “the” body fits into academic discourse, 
including curriculum theory, is also of particular importance because of the vast 
technological changes that have changed our concept of “humanness” and the ways we 
relate to our bodies.  Just as nature is not separate from culture, neither is technology.  
Today, technology not is not only influenced and is influenced by culture, it is culture.  
When we consider how our lives are, as Gray and Mentor (1995) note, intimately shaped 
by machines, we understand that such a profound presence must impact our corporeal 
subjectivities.  In fact, technology has long affected the way we think about our bodies; 
the body has often been reduced to a mere machine or a computer that takes in 
information and delivers an automatic response, especially when the mind/body binary is 
allowed to stand unchallenged.  It was technological advances in machinery that 
prompted the era of Taylorism, which found its way to educational practice and 
discourses of the body.   A post-human future, then, is not so much a future as it is a 
present reality.  As Cary Wolfe (1995) observes, “The moment is irredeemably post-
 26 
humanist because of the boundary breakdowns between animal and human, organism and 
machine, and the physical and the non-physical (p. 36).  
 These breakdowns have been widespread; not only has the pervasiveness of 
American mass media created a situation of sensory overload that forces our bodies to 
compete with digital stimulation, but science has brought about new ways of promoting 
longevity and “normalcy” through medication and a host of complicated biotechnical 
devices.  Donna Haraway (1989) explains that the body has become “ a biotechnical 
cyborg – an engineered communications device, and information generating and 
processing system, a technology for recognizing self and non-self (paradigmatically 
through the immune system), and a strategic assemblage of heterogeneous biotic 
components held together in a reproductive politics of genetic investment (p. 355).  Such 
posthuman phenomena require us to consider with great urgency if, and how, and where 
the body figures into this emerging discourse as we invite the body back into the equation 
through the proliferation of biotechnical machines. 
In my use of the word “body,” then, I hope to evoke this multitude of discourses 
that engage this term.   Here, I seek to discuss “the” body, these bodies, bodies of 
students and teachers, from a postmodern perspective of poststructuralism.  While it is 
impossible to adequately define the paradigm of postmodernism, which has had 
implications across the disciplines, it is most closely associated with Lyotard’s  (1984) 
collapse of the metanarrative, overarching, unifying themes, in The Postmodern 
Condition.  Postmodernism calls into question themes such as race, gender, and class, 
which seek to explain the nature of humanity. Postmodernism is seen as having grown 
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out of the modern era of progressive art, architecture, music and literature that occurred 
in the early decades of the twentieth century.    
Postmodernism, then, can be perceived as a critique of the modernist “structures” 
that were thought to be based on some essential, natural truth and were used to formulate 
an understanding of how things “are.”  Thus, developed from the postmodern 
understanding of the absence of a fixed reality or a final, discernable meaning, 
poststructuralism asserted that the structures underlying texts or speech were not distinct 
and that a “real” or “true” structure could not be determined.  As Baldwin et. al (2000) 
note, “Poststructuralism is more concerned with the way in which versions of the truth 
are produced in texts and through interpretation, which is always in dispute and can never 
be resolved” (p. 25).  The works of Derrida (1976), Baudrillard (1994/1981), and Deleuze 
and Guattari (1983, 1987) exhibit these poststructuralist ideas with their characterizations 
of self-subverting texts, linguistic signs, and shifting, interconnected, interdependent 
subjectivities. As Poster (1990) explains, language structures, as they are understood by 
poststructuralism, “refer back upon themelves, subverting referentiality and thereby 
acting upon the subject and constituting it in new and disorienting ways” (p. 17).  In this 
way, texts, inscribed in the language (signs) we used to express our thoughts, are always 
already unstable, corrupted by the gap that exists between the texts and language.  
Moreover, from a deconstructive perspective, we understand that all texts lack stable, 
autonomous meaning because our readings of them are inscribed in language that has no 
reliable correspondence to the author’s intention.  From this perspective, all-
encompassing “grand” readings are problematized.  As Poster (1990) explains, 
“Poststructuralists want to get beyond all forms of reductionist, totalizing interpretations 
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of texts. For them texts are not homogeneous, linear bodies of meaning; they are not 
expressions of authorial intention (p. 81). 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to locate a single source of poststructural thought, 
but it has been described as a theoretical response to Structuralism, the postwar 
intellectual revolution brought on largely by Saussure’s (1959/1916) linguistic theory of 
signs.  In general, structuralism asserts that all phenomena are made up of a system of 
structures, and that the relationships between the different elements of these structures are 
more important than the individual elements that constitute the system.  Both 
structuralism and poststructuralism share an intellectual history based on Freudian 
psychology, Marxism and the work of Saussure (1959/1916). Later, largely through the 
anthropological work of Lévi-Strauss (1966), the literary studies of Barthes (1973), the 
historical/philosophical approach of Foucault (1970), and the reinterpretation of Freud by 
Lacan (1977) and the reinterpretation of Marx by Althusser (1971), among other works, 
structuralism found its way into many other disciplines, including studies of popular 
culture. In philosophy, poststructuralism is linked to Delueze’s (1962) re-reading of 
Nietzsche in Nietzsche and Philosophy.  However, as Peters (1999) notes, 
“poststructuralism cannot be simply reduced to a set of shared assumptions, a method, a 
theory, or even a school. It is best referred to as a movement of thought -- a complex skein 
of thought -- embodying different forms of critical practice. It is decidedly 
interdisciplinary and has many different but related strands” (p. 2).  
Poststructuralism is vital to this exploration of the body, as it offers us ways to 
interrogate our attempts to locate “normalcy” through the languages of science, 
pathology, and neurobiology.  As Weaver (2000) explains, poststructuralism “offers a 
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critical reading of how science is constructed and used sometimes to justify certain 
policies, eliminate unwanted voices, and apologize for all its flaws and humanness in 
order to shroud science behind a cloth of godlike importance and ability (p. 6).  Here, 
poststructuralism provides a lens through which we can destabilize some of the prevailing 
narratives that have led us to dislocate the body from the school curriculum in a number 
of ways. In theorizing the poststructural body, we can fix our gaze on the future and gain 
insight into the ways that our images of the body are and will be impacted by our 
language and our social existences, as well as how our language and social existences are 
and will be impacted by our bodies.  The poststructural body, then, is discursive; it is a 
site of “information and practice, of regulation, power and resistance” (Pillow, 2000, p. 
214).  It is “inscriptive” body, the social organism upon which “social law, morality and 
values are inscribed” (Grosz, 1995, p. 33). And yet, it is not only that, for it is also the 
“lived body,” the corporeal body, a site where physiological processes are in constant 
states of function and breakdown.  Postructuralism offers a paradigm that avoids 
resurrecting a binary between inscribed and lived bodies, but allows these subject 
positions to exist, if only in the complex system of the connections, gaps, “flows,” 
interruptions, interactions and discontinuities that characterize our corporeal 
subjectivities.  In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari (1983) describe the body as a 
system of interconnected systems.  As Lorraine (1999) explains, “The binary series is 
linear in every direction because each flow-machine is connected to an interrupt-machine 
and vice versa.  That is, each flow-machine is always connected to another whose flow is 
interrupted or partially drained off and vice versa in connective linear series where there 
is always ‘and . . .’ ‘and then . . .’” (p. 119).  I borrow from Deleuze and Guattarri’s 
 30 
notions of processes and interconnected systems to examine the ongoing processes of the 
body and how they are connected to and interact with the processes of the educational 
machine, itself a series of interconnected systems.  
Similarly, Serres (1997/1991), draws on poststructural understandings of the 
importance of the “and,” the in-between spaces, and the relationships between the body 
and the mind.   Serres offers the notion of a “third space” that exists somewhere between 
the dualism of mind and body and draws these elements into an intimate connection.  He 
writes, “Body, muscles, nerves, direction and sensitivity, soul, brain and knowledge, all 
converge in this third place” (p. 10).  Here, I seek to explore the “in-between spaces” that 
lie between the curriculum and the body, where the two converge, diverge, and otherwise 
interact to construct and organize educational practice and academic discourse.   
 In spite of these discourses, we still find ourselves wary of bringing the 
materiality of the body into academic discussions, perhaps because we do not want to be 
guilty of asserting any essential “body” that corresponds to an original, natural form.  To 
do so would be to reify identity categories that we have already determined to be 
discursive fictions: race, class, and gender.  As Davis (2002) observes, DNA research has 
completely undermined these identity categories; scientists have yet to identify any 
person as belonging to a specific race through DNA analysis or find a “gay” gene, and 
genetic gender is no longer a reliable indication of sexual preference.  DNA, with its 
constantly shifting outcomes and limitless possibilities, supports the instability brought 
on by postmodernism.  However, a recognition of this instability does not come without 
discomfort, and it is perhaps for this reason that we have tended to leave the body out of 
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our intellectual pursuits.  Levy (2000) illustrates a “long history of avoiding the body” by 
citing Liz Stanley’s (1997) discussion of the “missing person” of academic disciplines: 
The person missing is one who is complex and rounded, who is “raced” and 
classed and gendered, who has a body and emotions and engages in sensible 
thought, and who inhabits space and place and time, and a person who may be a 
man but can be pathetic and weak, or who may be a woman but can be 
confidently powerful.  The disciplines are concerned with “bits” of social life, but 
even in their own terms what they choose to omit is considerable more than it 
need be (p. 83).   
If, as Stanley asserts, we are guilty of excluding this complex body from our intellectual 
pursuits, then is it relevant to discuss the ancient question of the mind/body split.  Since 
Descartes announced over 400 years ago, “I think, therefore I am,” issues of the body 
have often been relegated to margins of issues of the mind.  Unfortunately, in spite of the 
paradigm shifts brought on by postmodernism, this way of thinking still seems to find its 
way into educational practice. In the mind/body binary, the mind is privileged over the 
body so that the body becomes seemingly irrelevant in an educational context.  The 
intellectual is privileged over the physical so that disembodiment in many ways becomes 
desirable.   It is this kind of binary that leads us to view the body as a separate entity from 
its environment, the curriculum.  However, this study explores our selves not as 
disembodied, abstracted individuals but as human beings in the context of bodies that are 
impacted by the converging determinants of biology and social construction.  Toward 
that end, Shannon Sullivan (2001) borrows the term “transaction” from John Dewey and 
uses it “to indicate the dynamic, co-constitutive relationship of organisms and their 
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environments” (p. 1).  Sullivan (2001) explains how she extends this term to a non-
dichotomous understanding of the body:  
The term “transaction” reflects a rejection of sharp dualisms between subject and 
object, and self and world, as well as a rejection of the atomistic, 
compartmentalized conceptions of the subject and self that often accompany such 
dualisms.  The boundaries that delimit individual entities are permeable, not fixed, 
which means that organisms and their various environments – social, cultural, and 
political as well as physical – are constituted by their mutual influence and impact 
on each other.  This co-constitutive process does not merely happen once to 
establish static entities that never change; because the relationship between 
organism and environment is dynamic and ongoing, both organism and 
environment are continually being remade by means of shifts and changes in the 
other.  Thus “transaction” designates a process of mutual constitution that entails 
mutual transformation, including the possibility of significant change (p. 1).  
The transactional body, like Delueze and Guattari’s concept of flow-machines, is a 
dynamic body with permeable boundaries and is in a constant state of mutual influence 
with the context in which it is situated.  Here the body and the curriculum are not 
independent entities but mutually influenced systems that are constantly being remade as 
they shift and change.   
What I hope to accomplish with this dissertation, then, is a recognition that our 
bodies interact and intertwine with our pedagogies, and an understanding of how our 
interactions with the body in theory and the body in culture operate to exclude embodied 
knowledge from the curriculum. Here, I am writing on the discursive body, making my 
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own mark, examining what between and beyond the symbols and signs that we have 
ascribed to the flesh that mediates our relationships as teachers and students to the 
curricula that we deliver and consume. How do the body and the curriculum operate with, 
in, on and against one another?  How have we sought to construct a disembodied 
curriculum and what purpose has that curriculum served?  In the chapters that follow, I 
will explore these questions.  First, I will examine the historical interaction between 
theories of the body, “desubstantialized” culture, and the development of educational 
environments characterized by sterile, controlled bodies. I will also explore here the ways 
that the disembodied curriculum has shaped our perceptions of “disability” and the 
development of special education.   Next, I will engage the popular culture curriculum 
and investigate the implications of “disembodied” educational practice through the 
examination of social constructions of disability.  Then, in order to demonstrate how the 
disembodied school curriculum operates with social constructions of bodily “normalcy” 
to construct disability, I will investigate the epidemic of attention deficit disorders as 
symptomatic of disembodied curricula.    Finally, through the lens of disability studies, I 
will draw on Lennard Davis (2002) concept of “dismodernism” in an attempt to rethink 
and retheorize the postmodern, posthuman body through reflexive pedagogy.  Here, I 
hope to bring light to ways that students and teachers can reimagine corporeality and 
liberate the body from the margins of educational discourse and classroom practice. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BODIES IN THE MARGINS: A DISEMBODIED CURRICULUM 
 
One night when I was developing the framework for this chapter, John, almost 
two, came toddling to the bedside where I was propped up on pillows with my laptop and 
stacks of books.  He pushed aside my laptop so that he could climb onto the bed and into 
my arms.  He smiled knowingly as lifted my t-shirt to reveal my bare stomach and 
gleefully announced, “Tummy!”  Each of my three children has had their own way of 
seeking comfort from my body long after breast-feeding had ended: Taylor would always 
reach for an ear to manipulate in her little fingers, and James was most content when he 
was resting on my hip, but John, by far, has been the most sensual.  He loves the feel of 
soft, bare skin against his hand or cheek, so this “tummy time” for him is a nightly ritual.  
On this night, he happened to realize that he did not have a “name” for my belly-button; 
he examined it curiously, and looked to me for an explanation.  After a few tries, he could 
say “belly” (belly-button was just too many syllables) clearly, and then he began to 
examine his own.  “John’s belly, Mama’s belly,” he said, pointing back and forth, 
drawing the distinctions between us.  
After a while, he pushed the books aside and curled up beside me, still touching 
my stomach with his two little feet, and drifted into dreams, leaving me to wonder if you 
really ever outgrow the need for that kind of closeness, the comfort of human skin, a 
knowing of the body.  Why would such an act, which brought such pleasure when 
involving a toddler, seem awkward if initiated by an older child?  Why is that we feel that 
as children grow into adults they must learn to distance themselves from that kind of 
knowing, to control those bodily impulses, to create distance?  Why do so many 
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classrooms still seem quiet, tidy, sterile, impersonal?  Why are our material bodies 
relegated to the margins and footnotes of the “official” curriculum? 
These questions circulated as I thought about why I believe the public school 
curriculum and the educational practices it invites to be “disembodied.”  Let me begin by 
discussing the word, “disembodied.”  The Oxford American Dictionary, conveniently 
built into my laptop, defines it as: separated from or existing without the body, lacking 
any obvious physical source.  I think these definitions resonate with the way that I 
perceive American school curriculum.  When I first began to think about the relationship 
between the body and the curriculum (I was reading Anti-Oedipus by Deleuze and 
Guattari), I drew a cartoon of a school bus arriving to pick up a student, and the mother 
meeting the bus holding only her child’s brain.  The sentiment of my cartoon came from 
both my own experiences as an educator trying to deliver a standardized, impersonal 
curriculum in a meaningful way and the messages I have received as a student and 
scholar about the conflicts between the “material” world and the life of an intellectual.  
Here I want to allow my definition of disembodiment to be considered in all its 
multiplicities, and many of the numerous ways this word can be defined fit the qualities I 
am trying to communicate:  bodiless, incorporeal, discarnate, insubstantial, impalpable, 
spectral, phantom, wraithlike. 
I would like to describe here how three discourses, all of which merge at the site 
of body, problematize embodied knowing, learning, and teaching.  These three 
discourses, not intended to be all-inclusive or mutually exclusive, all operate to create 
“distance” from the body.  The first discourse involves modernist assumptions about 
schooling.  In spite of the vast changes that have taken place in American society, culture 
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and technology in the last century, much of what is believed about the way teachers 
should teach and children should learn is based on outdated notions about bodies and 
curricula.  These vast changes in culture and technology, particularly as they relate to 
children, are taken up in the second discourse, which engages the postmodern, digitally 
mediated realities of students.  The third discourse is that of postmodern/ poststructural 
identity theory, which brings identity and the body itself into a (necessary) state of 
instability.   
 To say that the body is largely absent in the curriculum is not to say that the body 
isn’t particularly prevalent elsewhere.  In fact, with the proliferation of mass media 
characteristic of American life, the body is literally everywhere.  Weight-loss clinics, 
products, books, plastic- surgery offices, advertisements, and reality television shows all 
loom large in public representations of the body.  Every year, there’s another diet craze, 
new information about what makes us fat, updated research about how fat and unhealthy 
we really are, and a few new additions to the list of celebrities with anorexia.  What’s 
more, we are constantly bombarded with pharmaceutical advertisements for all sorts of 
body enhancing drugs: anti-depressant, anti-anxiety, anti-inflammatory, and drugs that 
treat incontinence and erectile dysfunction.  However, this overwhelming presence of 
popular body discourse does not mean that we really understand our bodies and their 
relationship to our experiences in the world any better than before. In fact, far from 
helping us to embrace embodied knowing, these particular representations all serve to 
reinforce a hegemonic notion of (largely unrealistic) bodily norms that leaves us all the 
more confused and unsatisfied with our material contexts.  Moreover, the traditional 
educational environments in which many of our children find themselves offers them 
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neither a reliable outlet for interpreting these representations or a meaningful way of 
relating to the body at all outside of planned exercise and intermittent sex education 
instruction.   
Postmodern Bodies 
 Before I discuss in detail the modern approaches to curriculum and educational 
practice that have contributed to a disembodied curriculum, I want to consider the 
postmodern/ theoretical and cultural contexts in which those processes currently operate.  
Postmodernism, with its “incredulity toward metanarratives” as Lyotard describes it, has 
problematized the notions of fixed unities, and so had destabilized identity and the notion 
that the body could exist distinct biological construct, separate from and unaffected by 
the cultural context in which its emerged.  Postmodern thought across the disciplines 
allowed us to understand that being, identity, is not rooted in, inherent to, the body, but 
constructed through socio-cultural interactions.  Thus, our bodies become texts, to be 
read, interpreted, shaped, and discursively constructed. As a text, situated within 
language and representation, the body as a simply a biological organism that is resistant 
to cultural influence does not exist.    
The postmodern theorization of the body is important to this study because it is all 
about how those cultural influences have shaped our understanding of the body. The 
postmodern subject position recognizes the relationship between body and language, and 
thus, human experience. Thus, it would be antithetical for me to entertain any notion of 
resurrecting the body as distinctly biological, but I want to consider some of the ways that 
postmodern body can be problematic. With the rejection of a nature/culture binary, we 
remove the body from one side of a false dichotomy, and situate it within a complex, 
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fluid system, making it difficult to locate any substantive “self.”  If the body does not 
exist independently of culture, and we have to dissolve the notion that there is no distinct 
“nature,” then we are no longer responsible for explaining how nature and culture work 
together, and we are left with the question of whether the body can really be said to “be” 
at all.  As Peter McLaren (1988) points out, rarely in all the discourse of “bodies without 
organs, shadow bodies which are merely discursive fictions, or fractured bodies 
composed of solitary links along a signifying chain” do we ever find bodies and/or 
subjects  “who bleed, who suffer, who feel pain, who possess the critical capacity to 
make political choices, and who have the moral courage to carry these choices out.” (p. 
57).  
Here, I share Gail Weiss’s (2003) sentiment about the predicament this 
ontological indifference creates:  “While I, too, accept the notion that the body can and 
should be viewed as a text, I am also concerned about the ethical implications of such a 
position, implications that are rarely acknowledged and, for that very reason, all the more 
urgent to consider (p. 25).   It is dangerous to assume that we could understand the body 
outside of our cultural contexts, but we also take a risk by totally eliminating any notion 
of the physical because we are left without a way to understand phenomena, such as 
illness and injury, which seem to us to be physical. Perhaps this could explain we have 
often failed to include disability in our criticisms of identity, because as, Holmes (2003) 
notes, “Disability reminds us of that which is most personal (and thus shameful) in the 
intellectual life, that which is not aesthetic or abstract.  This same body is also what is 
least personal, most generically human – that which we in academia hope to surpass with 
distinctive and irreplaceable creations that usually celebrate our minds” (p. x) 
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 However, if we are to maintain an “incredulity toward metanarratives” as 
Lyotard (1984) indicated, we must not allow postmodernism itself to become a nihilistic 
metanarrative by constructing the body as either a discursive fiction or a distinct 
biological organism. Even Derrida (1984), who announced the “death” of the subject, 
admits that it does, indeed, exist: 
I have never said that the subject should be dispensed with.  Only that it should be 
deconstructed.  To deconstruct the subject does not mean to deny its existence.  
There are subjects, operations, or effects of subjectivity.  That is an 
incontrovertible fact.  To acknowledge this does not mean, however, that the 
subject is what it says it is.  The subject is not some meta-linguistic presence; it is 
always inscribed in language.  My work does not, therefore, destroy the subject; it 
simply tries to resituate it (p. 125).  
Similarly, if we intend to use postmodern/ poststructural knowledge as a connector rather 
than a divider, we can resituate the body without denying the physical existence of the 
flesh.  We can see the body, as disability studies scholar Lennard Davis (1995) asserts, as 
“a way of organizing through the realm of the sense the variations and modalities of 
physical existence as they are embodied into being through a larger social/political 
Matrix” (p. 14). This understanding of the body allows us to talk about the body without 
erasing the significance of its physical substance.  The body becomes, then, what 
McLaren’s (1995) terms, the “point d’appui,” the point at which we find the “dialectical 
reinitiation of meaning and desire” (p. 63).  Lecourt  (2004) puts it yet another way: “The 
body, that is, experiences and enacts culture as more than a discursive relation, but rather 
as a confluence of meaning, desire, and affect literally written into the flesh.  We learn 
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our identities in discursive relations that mediate experience; we perceive our bodies in 
their material relation to the world via such discursively constructed identities  (19).  To 
understand the body in this way allows us to bring the body back into academic discourse 
in a way that is meaningful and creates a space in which we can begin to develop an 
embodied postmodern/ poststructural paradigm. 
Digital Bodies 
If our intellectual engagements with postmodernism have left us feeling 
theoretically “disembodied,” then our immersion in the postmodern media age has had a 
similar effect culturally.  A decade ago, Samuel Weber (1996) asserted that television 
was “the most detached type of vision and audition” because the spectator can “see things 
from places – and hence, from perspectives and points of view (and it is not trivial that 
these are often more than one) – where his or her body is not (and often never can be) 
situated” (p. 116).   Weber suggests that television engages the senses in such a way that 
the body’s sensory functions are not necessary.  Such easily achieved and pervasive 
detachment from the situated body would not be possible without a medium that 
“becomes separation.”  Having grown up immersed in a television culture (cable came to 
the country when I was an adolescent and I have been hooked ever since), I can relate to 
this sense of detachment in working through my own confusions about how to relate to 
my body.  I cannot perceive my body separately from the impossible images that have 
permeated my being since infancy, and I am frustrated when I cannot find the sensory 
satisfaction offered by television and film (the intensity of the music, the vibrant color, 
the satisfying resolutions) in my daily lived experiences.  I can only imagine how 
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frustrated I might be if I were subjected to seven hours of the sensory-deprived traditional 
classroom environment.  
If the detachment of television has changed the way we relate to our bodies, then 
our confusion about how and where to situate our physical bodies has been exacerbated 
by the new pervasiveness of the digital image.  Weaver (2005) describes the 
omnipresence and significance of this new media:   
The digital image has entered into almost every aspect of our lives from the ways 
in which we entertain ourselves to enhancing our bodies, how we learn, and even 
how we die.  Although computer generated, the digital images have entered into 
the very materiality of our bodies and the realms of our thinking and 
consciousness . . .While the world we live in has been transformed and while our 
bodies are reconfigured into the posthuman, curriculum theorists have barely 
taken notice (p. 79). 
While the digital image remains in the margins of curriculum, as Weaver (2005) asserts, 
it is emerging as an integral part of the broader cultural curriculum that guides our 
understandings of how and where we, as subject-bodies, figure into the complex matrix 
of competing sensory stimulations.  McClaren (1988) observes that the byproduct of what 
Aronowitz (1983) calls “visual culture” is “desubstantialized meaning,” in which we find 
ourselves unable to “penetrate beyond the media-bloated surface of things, thereby 
dismissing concepts such as “society,” “capitalism,” and “history” which a not 
immediately present to the senses (p. 53).  
 The products of a desubstantialized culture are students like those that Marla 
Morris (2003) describes in her graduate-level Curriculum Studies course: 
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These presences, my students, embodied and troubled, haunted by a Southern 
past, wish that I (queer-Jewish-carpetbagger) would teach methods, recipes, and 
offer online, digital assignments.  Their phantasies of erasing differences, erasing 
difficulties of the face-to-face, erasing bodies dis(turbs) my pedagogical 
sensibilities.  Bodies matter.  Their wish to disappear into cyberspace con-fuses 
(p. 189). 
Indeed, as Morris observes, bodies do matter, but they become obfuscated in the complex 
visual, digital, desubstantialized media culture.   
Absent Bodies 
Thus, our children come to us, immersed in desubstantialized meaning and 
prosthetic sensory overload, and we offer them neither a way to resubstantialize meaning 
though embodied pedagogy or anything that meaningfully appeals to their need for 
sensory stimulation.  Instead, we offer a curriculum where the body is largely absent.  
This absence persists not only in public school classrooms, but also in academic 
institutions who prepare teachers for their roles as educators.   bell hooks (1994) 
describes this absence in her own experience: 
No one talked about the body in relation to teaching.  What did one do with the 
body in the classroom?  Trying to remember the bodies of my professors, I find 
myself unable to recall them, I hear voices, remember fragmented details, but 
very few whole bodies.  The public world of institutional learning was a site 
where the body had to be erased, go unnoticed (pp. 191-192). 
This erasure of the body from the institutional discourses of teaching and learning leaves 
us with instructional practices and environments that are distant from the realities of the 
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body.  Thomas Armstrong (1999) uses the example of the reclusive cashier, James Duffy, 
in James Joyce’s (1914) short story Dubliners to introduce describe the way we tend to 
separate the body from issues we perceive to be “of the mind:”  
He meets a woman, has an intense intellectual affair with her, and then breaks off 
the relationship when she presses her hand against his cheek.  As part of his 
description of Mr. Duffy, Joyce includes this rather curious line: “He lived a little 
distance from his body.” By this Joyce meant that the man lived in a mental 
prison divorced from any real contact with the sensory world.  In a larger sense 
Joyce’s character is a modern-day Everymind, an example of the split that has 
occurred in contemporary society between mental and physical faculties” (p. 77). 
While I would not go so far as to say that we are all living in mental prisons divorced 
from contact with the sensory world, I will point out that, in learning theory, the body has 
been reduced to second-class status.  For example, take the largely influential work of 
Jean Piaget.  He posits that during the first two years of life, which he calls the sensory-
motor stage, nearly all cognition occurs through the body:  the infant relies on touch and 
taste to experience the world.  Once these physical actions become internalized, cognitive 
development moves linearly through pre-operational (using symbols to represent objects), 
concrete (thinking abstractly and making judgments about observable phenomena), and 
formal operational (hypothesizing about abstract concepts and using deductive 
reasoning).  Clearly, the goal is move away from the cognition that occurs through the 
body toward an abstract, disembodied understanding of the world.  Piaget’s structural 
analysis of cognitive development, which has profoundly impacted curriculum 
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development, privileges knowing through the mind over knowing through the body, and 
depicts embodied cognition as simplistic and infantile. 
 One can see the influence of Piaget’s theories in many aspects of American 
culture, from the classic stereotype of the “dumb jock” to the social privileging of 
occupations in the humanities and sciences over the manual arts (Armstrong, 1999).  
Because we have so deeply internalized these structures of cognitive development, we 
also find it appropriate, if not necessary, to ensure that infants receive adequate sensory 
stimulation (specifically touching), but once we cross the invisible binary into “abstract” 
thinking, we believe we no longer “need” the body to learn.   As we progress through the 
developmental stages of childhood, we are taught to control our bodies so that the “real” 
learning can take place.   
As a result of this perceived need to distance ourselves from the body, we often 
bring the body into the classroom only in the sense that we must access the “brain” to 
train the “mind.”  These privileged disembodied subjectivities carry over into the 
classroom and influence pedagogical practice. We sterilize the curriculum and the 
classrooms to make them “clean” and “safe,” distant from the realities of intermingling 
bodies because the body is problematic when it comes to both academic discussion as 
well as “proper” instruction.  As Levy (2000) notes,  
The body is actively sexual or at least sensual.  (It may also be maternal, pregnant, 
breast-feeding; in one way or another desirous, undisciplined, unruly, that is, 
bodily). “Embodiment” draws our attention to a connection between materiality 
and the psychic world, between social and cultural conditions and circumstances, 
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between desires and pleasures, as well as disappointments; thinking about and 
through all this undermines “orderly” teacher-student relations (p. 83). 
Confronting these messy relationships means that we risk opening ourselves up to the 
sensual, to desires, to disorder, which don’t fit in the devices and structures of control that 
places the teacher/text at the center of instruction. Schools become not a Deleuzian 
generative environment where everything functions at the same time amid hiatuses and 
ruptures, but a controlled, sterile environment where bodies are necessary vehicles to 
house the mental faculties.     
Obedient Bodies 
As it seems that the curriculum operates to dismiss the body part of the 
educational process, it makes sense that bodies must be closely controlled in order to 
ensure the continued obedience of the human body and the sterility of the educational 
environment.  In the post-Columbine era, the regulation and surveillance of bodies in 
schools has become particularly prevalent (Webber, 2003).  Middleton (1998) explains 
that “Through Foucauldian lenses, power indeed shows up as ‘capillary,’ as it flows 
through all parts of the school’s ‘corporate body.’  All individuals channel power: 
Students and teachers police each others’ outward appearance, deportment, and behavior, 
although it is the teacher who officially has power over the students” (p. 21). Similarly, 
Sara Biklin (in Middleton, 1998) observes that “school rules regulate both students and 
teachers.  Teachers’ bodies are regulated by the very restrictions they establish for the 
children . . . adults’ days [are] controlled by needing to be placed in a supervisory 
position in relation to children” (p. 179). 
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Perhaps even more important and personally relevant to my experience as an 
educator is the control mechanism of textualization.  In spite of widespread rhetoric about 
the need for “authentic assessment” and student-centered learning, we continue to use 
text to distance ourselves from the body.  Rather than completely ignoring the body, we 
look beyond it by transferring into texts that can be studied and evaluated, controlled. 
Foucault (1978) has used textualization to explain the regulation of sex in disciplinary 
society, in which sex had to be studied and committed to writing in order to be properly 
controlled.  The same concept can be applied to the textualization of knowledge in the 
school setting. Textualization, in the curricular sense, becomes a mechanism of creating 
distance between knowledge and the body; the self must be written in order to be 
disciplined, controlled.  Hayes and Johnson (2003) explain: 
Textualization is one of the technologies of modern schooling.  The process is put 
into place through the emergence of the self by means of a constant remanding of 
the self to the text (Fendler, 1993).  In much of school curriculum, individuals 
submit their inner thoughts and views to written or spoken texts so that they 
become visible and accessible to the systems of control that evaluated and define 
school knowledge.  . . The authored text exposes the self to the powers of 
surveillance and domination by opening the self for analysis, critique, and 
regulation within the system of schooling. (p. 147.) 
There are many ways that the authored text emerges in schooling, including canonical 
textbooks, teacher-directed writing, and, especially, testing, both teacher-constructed and 
standardized. 
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With the current emphasis on standardized testing as a measure of school 
accountability and evidence of “learning,” the impact of textualization is clear.  The 
process of constant assessment and commission of the self to text begins as soon as the 
child enters the system and the texts that define them follow them throughout their school 
careers and on into adulthood.  The narrow aspects of the self reflected on the tests can 
then be explored and the process of evaluation and categorization becomes perpetual.  As 
Hayes and Johnson note, “The network of tests, assessments and judgments creates a 
paper trail that leads directly to the child.  Once the child is tracked within this text there 
are many different forms of evaluation that can be made, and verdicts handed down.”  (p. 
147.) 
 The textualization that has been exacerbated by the emphasis on testing and the 
texts of the school curriculum, as Foucault (1985) demonstrates, is not new.  With the 
invention and proliferation of print, the bodies of authors could easily be “erased,” 
creating a false objectivity.  Michael Warner (1983) illustrates how the modern bourgeois 
public sphere claimed to have no relation to the body image at all:   
Public issues were depersonalized so that, in theory, any person would have the 
ability to offer an opinion about them and submit that opinion to the impersonal 
test of public debate without personal hazard.  Yet the bourgeois public sphere 
continued to rely on features of certain bodies.  Access to the public came in the 
whiteness and maleness that were then denied as forms of positivity, since the 
white male qua public person was only abstract rather than white and male (p 382, 
quoted in Grumet, 2003). 
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This way of thinking persists, and perhaps has even increased, in light of the stringent 
requirements of No Child Left Behind. William C. Rhodes (1995) asserts that, “we have 
been taught to be spectators, rather than constructors, of knowledge” (458).  Rhodes aptly 
describes the modernist thought that has continued to dominate educational practice.  
This speaks particularly to the way we have viewed learning and teaching; students of all 
ages and disciplines have been taught to be the passive recipients of knowledge.  We, in 
our modernists mindsets, have reified knowledge and used it to define who we are and, in 
turn, separate ourselves from other.  In terms of the body, we have reified what we have 
perceived as “normal” and used it to categorize ourselves in terms of physical difference, 
and to write the body out of public education.  Moreover, although the testing companies 
make an effort to create tests that are reflect a multicultural constituency, the 
depersonalized logical/analytical ways of knowing the tests are designed to measure on 
still based on white male intellectual ideals.  Yet, the judgments and verdicts that can be 
made from these tests are virtually endless. Particularly in the case of Attention Deficit 
Disorders, the rise in the number of students who qualify as being “disabled” has often 
been attributed to the increase in medical “knowledge” about such disabilities, and this 
statement exemplifies the significance as well as the isolating potential of textualization:  
medical and educational professionals do have more knowledge about such conditions 
because of the rise in the pervasiveness and importance of testing that reveals only a 
narrow aspect of a student’s being.  The more we value one way of demonstrating 
knowledge through textualization, which seems to be the unfortunate result of increases 
in testing, the more “exceptional” students we will find.  With such a model based on 
identifying deficiencies based on a very limited scope of understanding, rather than 
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knowing more about the students, we actually know less.  We learn nothing about who 
the student is beyond these limited deficiencies, and the underlying message is that we 
are not interested in knowing. 
 As a result of the emphasis placed on standardized assessment, school reform 
advocacy groups like the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development 
(ASCD) encourage the utilization of data-analysis to make informed decisions about how 
to improve learning.  This practice is highly effective in determining the deficiencies of 
students based on the narrow standards of the state curriculum, but it reifies the process 
of textualization and further distances our educational decisions at an institutional level 
from the immediate, lived realities of the students sitting in our classrooms.  The concept 
of disembodiment through textualization may seem somewhat contradictory; as with 
Foucault’s theory on the regulation of sex, the regulation of self occurs not through 
complete dismissal, but through persistent and pervasive, even medicalized, examination.  
Alan Block (1998) expands on this notion, observing that the school and the curriculum 
promote “incarceration by visibility” (p. 327).  He explains: “In the school we are defined 
by what we know, which is always linked to written reports delimiting that knowledge, 
and increasingly, what we know is written by others.  We are always to be found by our 
position on the well-traveled, well-lit and heavily-marked path which is the curriculum” 
(Block, 1998, p. 327).  Because our students are transcribed into text, we can analyze 
their data and always know where they stand on the achievement continuum, which is 
based largely on linear assumptions about the way that children should develop distance 
from bodily cognition and move into “higher-level” ways of knowing the world.  Just as 
each time my daughter visits the pediatrician, she is plotted into a chart based on 
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“normal” height and weight, students are carefully tracked based on the volume of the 
official curriculum that they can demonstrate knowledge of.  Textualization is a 
technology operates to make student deficits more visible.  This “visibility” offers us 
comfort in the form of a commodity, a thing, knowledge, but as Cohen and Weiss (2003) 
acknowledge, that visibility does not necessarily produce truth:  “Poked, probed, sliced, 
prosthetically enhanced and surgically diminished, transplanted, and artificially 
stimulated, the body in contemporary culture is the volatile subject of both textual and 
material fascination.  The explosion of technologies and methodologies that claim to give 
us better access to “the truth” of the body have made the body more visible and yet more 
elusive. (p. 1). 
In addition to standardized testing, the pervasive reliance on textbooks contributes 
to the distancing that occurs through textualization.  In spite of much discussion about the 
need for differentiation and “student-centered” learning, the booming school publishing 
industry is an indication that textbooks continue to dominate instruction in many 
classrooms.  Textbooks are commonly utilized for students as young as first grade, and 
some simpler forms of textbooks are used as early as kindergarten.  While there are many 
interesting and visually pleasing textbook series on the market, the overuse of textbooks 
is problematic because it accelerates the textualization process.  Students must learn to 
relate to the world through the text; the curriculum “represents relations between 
students; rather than them forging their own relationship with each other, the curriculum 
mediates their relations for them” (Webber, 2003, p. 4).  Young children are taught early 
on that worthy knowledge comes from beyond their own lived experiences, and that 
learning is not really about them, but about the text.   Ayers (2001) expresses his 
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concerns about most textbooks, describing them as “limited in a thousand ways: 
uninteresting, irrelevant, written in a vapid, formulaic style, apparently by a committee of 
scholars intent on maximizing sales by offending no one,” which resulted in “a kind of 
muzak for the mind – easy listening some of the time, an annoying background buzz 
much of the time, catchy but not substantive.” (p. 85).  The key word in Ayers’ 
description is substantive: the textbooks have little substance, they are insubstantial, 
disembodied, removed from any obvious physical source, and they are often presented as 
the only way to acquire new information.  
 Those of us who have older children or have taught children older than 7 or 8 
know that many, if not most, children find this way of acquiring new information boring.   
Learning through text is impersonal, sterile.  Drawing on the work of Todd (1997), Hayes 
and Johnson (2003) observe, “ Stripping pleasure and desire of all sorts from the school 
curriculum leaves school knowledge as one part of an interchangeable and normative 
apparatus.  This is a disciplining of the body, a process of containing the excesses of the 
body by which pleasure and desire are produced” (pp. 152-153).  In the town where I live 
and work, we have a state funded pre-kindergarten program that is housed in the old 
building where I attended Elementary School.  When you visit the classrooms there, you 
see many wide-eyed children full of wonder, happy to be exploring and learning in an 
environment that is designed around their interests and realities.  In my experience, I 
haven’t known many preschoolers that said they hated school, and this is often the case 
for kindergarten.   However, once children realize, through testing and grading and 
categorizing, what school is “really” about, there is a drastic decline in their enthusiasm. 
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Foucault (1985) explains that there is a purpose in the way we make education so 
unappealing:     
It’s quite an achievement the way teachers manage to make learning unpleasant, 
depressing, gray, unerotic!  We need to understand how that serves the needs of 
society.  Imagine what would happen if people got into as big a frenzy about 
learning as they do about sex.  Crowds shoving and pushing at school doors! It 
would be a complete social disaster.  You have to make learning so rebarbative if 
you want to restrict the number of people who have access to knowledge (p. 52). 
The payoff that results from the categorization of textualization is two-fold:  it allows us 
to privilege certain ways of knowing so that social status can be assigned, and it allows us 
to avoid the messy reality of such “frenzied” bodies.  Certainly, we could not maintain 
the sterile, controlled school environments we are comfortable with if we allowed it to be 
so impassioned.   
 Although the school curriculum has successfully distanced itself from the body 
through texts, we have not yet discovered a way for students to be educated in a 
traditional classroom without bringing their bodies along.  We are teaching bodies; we 
enter the classroom with our own corpo-realities (our teaching bodies) to teach bodies, 
each with their own set of needs, desires and interests.  However, because the body is not 
“allowed” in the official curriculum, we must push those contexts into the margins in 
order to reveal the depersonalized canon.  As Scheman (1997) explains, “The privileged 
are precisely those who are defined not by the meanings and uses of their bodies for 
others but by their ability either to control their bodies for their own ends or to seem to 
exist virtually bodilessly” (p. 351).  Through the distancing of the educational process, 
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teachers and students must train themselves to keep their bodies at bay; there is no place 
for the sensual, the pleasurable, the provocative.  The successful teacher must train his or 
her body in order to exemplify the posture of teacherly authority:  “Not only must 
teachers wear clothing considered appropriate, but they must also learn to control facial 
expressions, to hold an authoritative stance in the classroom, and to remain decorous.  
For most teachers, this bodily discipline becomes automatic” (Jones, 2003, p. 110).  
  The same type of bodily discipline is expected to become automatic for the 
students as well, and if they cannot achieve a certain level of control, we recommend 
them for further testing so that we can identify the cause of their perceived deficiency.  
Franklin (2003) compares the disembodied educational process for all students to many 
women’s experience of initiation into adulthood: “a process of instruction during which 
they learn that they must take themselves out of relationship (to their bodies and to 
others) in order paradoxically to be in relationship.  Be less to be more.  Shut down to be 
open.  Attend but not to this context, this time and place, or these bodies” (p. 19).   
In the context of textualization, in the architecture of control, we must shut down 
our bodily needs, desires, and impulses to open our minds to learning.  This negation of 
the body leaves me to wonder, if, as Terry Eagleton asserts, “Aesthetics is born as a 
discourse of the body,” where in this impersonal, disembodied environment is art, 
pleasure, passion?  Hayes and Johnson (2003) lament, in a sentiment that has been 
expressed by Peter Applebaum (1995) and Alan Block (1998), “The poetic, the 
embodied, the momentary, the emotional, and the pleasurable have been all but purged 
from how we think of school knowledge.”  If our hope is to prepare students for a future 
that holds no promise of poetry, then the curriculum serves us well.  We comfort 
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ourselves with the belief that we are safely and generically delivering the essential skills, 
the cultural capital, that will lead them to become productive citizens.  However, we fail 
to treat children “as persons with stories to tell and unrealized potentials to be nurtured.  
In the guise of preparing children for a better future, we defend ourselves against 
knowledge of their current lives that might be painful of disconcerting” (Silin, 2003, p. 
14).   
Unruly Bodies 
There is another, more sinister, spawn of the intertwined discourses of 
textualization and bodily discipline.  If we have constructed the school as a place where 
the body must be in a strict state of discipline, what outlet do we offer to those whose 
bodies represent to us instability, uncertainty, disorder?  By constructing a category of 
normalcy that is based not only a limited view of intelligence but a necessary capability 
of bodily restraint, we can differentiate those who can meet those standards (the able) 
from those who cannot (the dis-abled).  Thus, we must come to understand that we, as 
educators, administrators, schools, systems, so on, construct disability.  It is not the 
physical makeup of our students that render them disabled but the standards by which we 
judge them capable of learning.  The category of “disabled” is certainly not new, but it 
has fluctuated greatly throughout history.  The issue of ability first came into play when 
American education was in its infancy, and the primary goal was to develop a labor 
market.  As Ng (2003), explains:  
In the development of a progressively elaborated and differentiated labor market, 
skills needed in the production process are formalized.  Education is a major 
mechanism through which people acquire skills, which they sell in exchange for 
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wages in the labor market.  In standardizing training for paid employment, those 
whose learning does not fit into the standardized classroom format are seen as 
problematic.  Again, we see how something that originates in the social process 
becomes a person’s personal attributes. (p. 211). 
When we standardize the assessment of students into a very limited way of learning and 
knowing, we set ourselves up for exceptions, those that do not fit the model we have 
idealized through mandated texts and high-stakes testing.  In doing so, we see an 
increased need for what we call “special education,” for our “exceptional children,” the 
exceptions to the standards we have set. 
  Special education, like “disability” itself, is not new, but as standards for what 
counts as “learning” have become more stringent, those categories have grown to include 
more exceptions. In fact, as Foucault (1970) explains in The Order of Things, the 
structures of control and bodily discipline were established long before standardized 
assessment became an issue, so in the early history of American education, students with 
disabilities were easily identified as those that might disrupt the otherwise orderly 
learning environment.  Furthermore, if early aim of schools was to produce workers, 
anyone who couldn’t or shouldn’t perform the jobs the market had to offer (including for 
some time women, of course) didn’t belong there.  During the early 20th century, some 
states passed laws requiring that schools create “special” classes for the “disciplinary” 
and “backward,” but it was not until the 1970s that mentally and physically handicapped 
students were included in regular classrooms (Spring, 2001).     
 With the growth of standardized curricula and later, standardized assessment, 
came the proliferation of “labels,” or specific categories of disability.  These terms 
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evolved from “Crippled,” “Deaf,” “Subnormal,” “Prevocational” and “Mentally 
Retarded,” to more the more politically correct versions we now employ:  Hearing-
Impaired, Learning-Disabled, Emotional-Behavioral Disorder, Attention Deficit 
Disorder, Other Health-Impaired.  Again, we see the “incarceration of visibility” inherent 
in the textualization of the deficits presented by these students:  we perceive that by 
labeling their deficiencies, we know more about how to “teach” them to respond in the 
way that is idealized by the standardized assessment.  Ayers (2001) disagrees, as do I, 
that the “truths” revealed by labels are illusive:  “Labels are limiting.  They offer a single 
lens concentrated on a specific deficit when what we need are multiple ways of seeing a 
child’s ever-changing strengths.  All the categories are upside down – they conceal more 
than they reveal.  They are abstract, when we need is immediate and concrete” (p. 29).  
What we need is to know who our students are, their desires, their interests, their 
curiosities, how they express themselves, how they perceive themselves, what they bring 
to the learning experience.  Unfortunately, the message we send, particularly to these 
“exceptional” students, is that those aspects of their being are unimportant. In fact, 
students in special education often perform well in areas of life outside the standard 
classroom, which supports the assertion that disability is, indeed, socially constructed.  
For Ng (2003) the construction of disability is particular to the textualized, standardized 
school environment:  
Instead of treating students’ abilities as given, therefore, we need to interrogate 
how they arise in the social organization of the school.  We need to analyze how 
labeling students as having special needs based on perceptions about their 
abilities, seen to be their personal attributes rather than socially produced 
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properties, is consequential, not only for their schooling experience, but for their 
eventual participation in the labor market (p. 212). 
 This should force us to question the norm on which the “otherness” of these 
characteristics are based.  If we look carefully at the disproportionate numbers of students 
with disabilities who have already been “othered” based on their race or socioeconomic 
status, we can see where the majority of our “exceptions” fall. The pathological 
categories we have used to label students are “socially constructed scales used to measure 
socially powerless children according to educational criteria that just happen to 
characterize the designers of the scales as superior” (Rhodes 1995, 460).  If we truly 
accepted the notion of democracy, we would understand the bigotry behind the 
categorization of students based on standardized assessment. At some point, perhaps 
when we became a “Nation At-Risk,” we realized how many students were not successful 
in the traditional educational model, but instead of interrogating the tradition and 
questioning the elitist norms on which those traditions were based, we began to 
aggressively classify those who had different learning needs.  Perhaps if we had called 
that reality into question, we might have taken steps to change our approach to education 
instead of turning to pathology to isolate and “treat” the underachievers along with the 
physically disabled students we had already excluded.   
 I have brought up the issue of special education here because I believe that it is 
most symptomatic of the disembodied curriculum, of our desire to shun the complex 
issues of difference that surround the vast continuum of humanness.  I believe that 
thinking through issues of the body’s place in the curriculum requires us to interrogate 
disability, to own the injustices we have wrought because of our desires for the neatness 
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and order of controlled educational environments.  As Holmes (2003) suggests, disability 
is not something that we want to confront, it makes visible that which will not be 
disappeared: the body and its sensations and needs, not all of which involve jouissance, at 
least not in the relatively limited terms imagined by non-disabled culture.  Disability also 
makes visible that which must disappear, despite our best efforts: the body that is 
impermanent and will die (p. x).  Rather than face these uncertainties, we have, for much 
of the history of American education marginalized these “others” who did not meet our 
standards; disorderly, disadvantaged, discarded, disabled.  These injustices have not gone 
entirely unnoticed:  On December 13, 1993, the cover of U.S. News and World Report 
touted the headline:  SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL – How Special Education Programs 
are Cheating Our Children and Costing Taxpayers Billions Each Year.”  The article was 
published at a time when the public was taking notice of the continued failure of special 
education programs across the country to demonstrate any meaningful progress.  Such 
outspoken concern over the effectiveness of special education has led to some 
reorganization in special education, particularly an emphasis on including special 
education students in the regular classroom.  The inclusion of special education students 
rests on the premise that these students should not be denied access to the appropriate 
grade-level curriculum their peers receive and that they should be guaranteed, as federal 
law now mandates, the “least restrictive” environment possible.  However, this solution 
still overlooks the underlying issue of otherness when it comes to teaching and learning.  
A child who was removed from a “regular” education classroom because she could not 
learn the material the way it was being taught is not going to “magically” learn the 
material just because she is placed back in with peers her age if the same preconceived 
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notions about disability and otherness exist.  We think we can “normalize” her disability 
through inclusion, but she will continue to be denied access to the cultural currency her 
school has to offer as long as a “one-size fits all” approach is perpetuated. 
 In recent years, theories of multiple intelligences, advocated primarily by Gardner 
(1983) and Thomas Armstrong (1999) have helped to decentralize the “sit and get” 
approach that dominated instruction for so long.  In fact, as Georgia has begun the 
process of adopting its new performance standards, “differentiation” according to 
learning style, interest and readiness has been emphasized.  However, in many cases, “sit 
and get” has simply become “sit/stand/dance/sing/draw or write and get.”  In other words, 
we have found different ways for students to internalize the information that we are 
passing down to them, but the underlying perception of how we learn, the need to remand 
ourselves to the text, has remained unchanged.    
 In the disembodied curriculum, we have placed development, issues of the body, 
in a one category and the transmission of information in another. We have clung to the 
passive model of education, a model that requires us to disconnect our minds from our 
bodies in order to be informed, shut down to be open.  Cummins (2003) aptly describes 
what is missing in this approach, a pedagogy of indifference where embodied, 
meaningful learning is concerned:  
Nowhere in this anemic instructional vision is there room for really connecting at 
a human level with culturally diverse students; consigned to irrelevance also is 
any notion of affirming students’ identities, and challenging coercive power 
structures, by activating what they already know about the world and mobilizing 
the intellectual and linguistic tools they use to make sense of their worlds.  This 
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kind of programming reduces instruction to a technical exercise.  No role is 
envisaged for teachers or students to invest their identities (affect, intellect, and 
imagination) in the teaching/learning process (p. 56).   
As I have detailed here, and as Cummins makes clear, the human element of embodied 
teaching and learning is largely missing from the standardized curricula, sterilized and 
often segregated classrooms, and impersonal instructional methods that characterize 
American education.  The disembodiment of curriculum has not only left us confused 
about where our own bodily realities fit within the architecture of control but has also 
reified the persistent devaluing of those embodied and “disabled” knowing.  At what 
point will our isolation bring us to resurrect the body in the curriculum?  When will we 
have the courage to rethink the body’s role in our subjectivities, to re-imagine “normal?” 
Bringing our bodies out of the margins of our academic identities and into the foreground 
will challenge us to think through the one identity category that no one chooses.  Martha 
Stoddard Holmes (2003) provides an example of the difficulties we face in confronting 
questions of the body.  She found that “[t]rying to work out the relationships between 
disabled bodies and non-disabled ones made my students feel vulnerable because it was 
literally unimagined territory.  They imagined they would date and marry a non-disabled 
person who would stay that way; they imagined they would always be non-disabled. 
(Holmes, 2003, viii). We need to broaden our imaginations and embrace the instability of 
the disabled/ able continuum if we hope to make education more meaningful, more 
personal.  Toward that end, as teachers, students and scholars, we need “more situated, 
theoretically nuanced analyses of bodies and feelings that honor their social, inter-
subjective and historical status and engage our actual lives in our feeling bodies” 
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(Holmes, p. xi, 2003).  With this project, I, in my temporarily-able body, join many 
impassioned, embodied inquiries of those who have preceded me into the field of 
disability studies in attempting to meet that need.   
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CHAPTER 3 
LIFE GOES ON:  
DISABILITY, CURRICULUM AND POPULAR CULTURE 
    
It seems to me that it was quite by accident that I stumbled upon the realm of 
disability studies while writing my doctoral dissertation on the relationships between 
curriculum and the body.  I think doctoral students, hoping to find a niche for themselves 
within their respective fields, are always on the lookout for new directions in theory, new 
ways of understanding and articulating our own insights into scholarship.  As I began 
reading, I became intrigued by what Lennard Davis (1995) calls the “strange and really 
unaccountable silence” about the issue of disability in academic discourse.  Davis writes:   
The silence is stranger, too, since so much of the left criticism has devoted itself 
to the issue of the body, of the social construction of sexuality and gender. 
Alternative bodies people this discourse: gay, lesbian, hermaphrodite, criminal, 
medical, and so on. But lurking behind these images of transgression and 
deviance is a much more transgressive and deviant figure: the disabled body (p. 
5).  
As I pondered my own understanding of that “transgressive and deviant figure” and 
became immersed in the literature of disability studies, I have found myself feeling as 
though I might have, at least for a time, found a theoretical home that makes sense to me.  
I find here theorists asking questions that resonate with my own confusions, questions 
like those Martha Stoddard Holmes (2003) asks in her opening to Fictions of Affliction: 
What kind of bodies are represented as feeling bodies – stocked with pain, 
sympathy, disgust, desire, and laughter, not just blood, organs, tissues, nerves, and 
muscles?  Why, and in what contexts, do we read our won or others’ physical 
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bodies as slates on which feelings are writ large, or as markers in an emotional 
landscape?  What cultural texts inform those readings, what intelligence guides 
them, and what power do they wield (and for whom)? (p. vii). 
These are the questions I seek to stir through an analysis of popular culture. 
But let me be completely honest about why I am writing about disability.  
  
I am obsessed with my body.  I weigh myself every day (sometimes twice).  I 
examine my body in the mirror most mornings, but not before mentally preparing myself 
for disappointment.  I spend hours reading up on different diets and meticulously 
planning meals.  I can’t not think about my body.  But sometimes the ridiculousness of 
my obsession occurs to me when I realize how closely my body reflects the physical 
norms of American society:  five feet six inches, 36/30/36, 126 pounds, with a million 
parts, limbs, organs, cells, almost perfectly in place.  That’s when the what-ifs come into 
play.  What if suddenly I find myself inhabiting a body that in some way doesn’t live up 
to society’s expectations?  I am extremely near-sighted, and I used to have nightmares 
about waking up in the middle of the night to find that I had gone blind.  One of my 
biggest fears throughout my life has been disfigurement by burning.  Every time a joint 
aches or a bump appears, I rush to the internet to check my symptoms for signs of some 
dreaded disease.   
So, regardless of how accepting I have become of other’s differences in my own 
experience, I have to admit that bodily norms have clearly had a profound affect on both 
my perceptions of bodies and my physical body itself.  These are the norms of an ableist 
culture, a society that has allowed disabilities and disfigurements to be read as other, 
strange, or in Freud’s (1963) term, “uncanny.”  Freud (1963) says “this uncanny is in 
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reality nothing new or alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the 
mind and which has become, alienated from it only through the process of repression” (p. 
240).  Perhaps then, our perceptions of disabled bodies can be traced to our own fears 
about the degeneration of our own bodies through disease, accident, or aging.  For me, 
interrogating how our (or perhaps I should say my) culture of ableism has constructed 
disability forces me to confront these fears and confusions I have about bodily normalcy.   
At 30, I think it’s time that I come to terms with the conceptual turmoil that has 
dominated most of my lived experience.  Why look to popular culture?  Davis (1995) 
says “Disability is a specular moment.  The power of the gaze is to control, limit and 
patrol how the person is brought to the fore.  Accompanying the gaze are a welter of 
powerful emotional responses.  These responses can include horror, fear, pity, 
compassion and avoidance” (p. 12).  For me, the significance of popular culture is 
“specular,” because here we are afforded a (almost) guiltless gaze, because in my mind 
are the indelible images of the impossibly thin, seductive women that years of avid 
television watching and magazine reading have left behind.  And if my immersion in 
popular media can speak volumes about my own desires for normalcy, it must have 
something important to say about my perceptions of disability.  Furthermore, if we take 
seriously the profound presence of popular culture in American society, then we must 
accept that the media that we engage in shapes our assumptions about disability.  
I want to explore popular, particularly cinematic, representations of disability 
because, as Giroux and Simon (1989) note, “Popular culture represents a significant 
pedagogical site that raises important questions about the relevance of everyday life, 
student voice, and the investments of meaning and pleasure that structure and anchor the 
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why and how of learning (p. 5).  I believe that popular culture raises particularly relevant 
questions about the way that we have constructed disability and excluded bodies from the 
curriculum based on this otherness.  As Daspit (2000) asserts, “Curricular appropriation 
of popular culture may assist in reorganizing the prevailing narratives that schooling has 
perpetuated” (p. 165).  Here, I appropriate popular culture to investigate how 
representations of disability have assisted in organizing prevailing narratives of disability 
in educational settings and offer critical readings of some particular texts in at attempt to 
reorganize those narratives.  
Writing Disabled Bodies  
In order to understand how perceptions of disability have operated to impact our 
collective decisions regarding education environments, we must further investigate the 
ways the popular culture has “written” the disabled body.  Norden points out the 
significance of popular representations, particularly films, have operated to construct and 
objectify disability (1994): 
By encouraging audience members to perceive the world depicted in the moves, 
and by implication the world in general, from this perspective and thus associate 
themselves with able-bodied characters, this strategy has a two-fold effect: it 
enhances the disabled characters’ isolation and “Otherness” by reducing them to 
objectifications of pity, fear, scorn, etc. – in short, objects of spectacle – as a 
means of pandering to the needs of the able-bodied majority, and it contributes to 
a sense of isolation and self-loathing among audience members with disabilities 
(p. 1).  
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I believe that the narratives of isolation and otherness highlighted by Norden offer insight 
into the way have organized a disembodied school curriculum that allows the exclusion 
of particular bodies based on the assignment of disability.  My intention here is not to 
apologize for or justify my own bodily egoism or to evoke sympathy for people with 
disabilities by exposing and examining the ways American popular culture has 
conceptualized disability in sometimes subtle and particularly damaging ways. Rather, I 
look to gain insight into the culturally and historically situated bodies of the differently-
abled by investigating contemporary popular culture (specifically, films and television) 
with the same question Holmes (2003) asked of Victorian literature: “What are the 
longer-term effects of the coding of all of our bodies – through the recurrent stories that 
shape our social relations – as bodies instructed to feel in limited ways?” (p. vii).  Here, 
those “longer-term” effects include the individual and collective perceptions of disability 
through the embedded curriculum of popular culture as well as the development of the 
official curriculum that has dominated education in the 20th century and has excluded 
disabled students in multiple ways. 
Jenkins, McPherson, and Shattuc (2002) observe that when it comes to analyzing 
the media, the challenge is “to write about out own multiple (and often contradictory) 
involvements, participations, engagements, and identifications with popular culture – 
without denying, rationalizing, and distorting them.  The best cultural critics speak as 
“insiders” as well as “outsiders” (p. 7).   It is difficult to write about disabled bodies and 
representations of disabled bodies without inadvertently engaging the same pathologies 
and voyeurisms in which those representations were constructed because, as Snyder and 
Mitchell (2001) observe, there is no “sensual and sensory language to theorize the body 
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itself” (p. 381).  Even the term itself, “disability,” a term which itself constructs a binary 
between the able and “dis” able, does not adequately represent the continuum of physical 
and/or mental abilities that can be discussed. However, I attempt to meet that challenge 
by writing as a participant in the social construction of disability (through my 
internalization of bodily norms) and both a consumer and a critic of cultural 
representations of disability (which can encompass a vast continuum of physical and/or 
mental ability), in order to better understand those involvements, participations, 
engagements, and identifications from the perspective of the able-bodied. 
Let me begin by highlighting an example of the contradictions posed by 
contemporary representations of disability. When I began to think about the ways that 
people with disabilities had been portrayed in my own experience of popular culture, I 
thought of Corky.  In the television series, Life Goes On, which aired on ABC from 1989 
to 1993, the lovable lead character, teenager Corky Thatcher, was “mainstreamed” into a 
regular school with his sympathetic “normal” peers. The actor who played Corky, Chris 
Burke, emerged not long after the mainstreaming “movement” had taken hold.   Burke 
also had Down's syndrome, a relative first for American television, and a subject of 
considerable media coverage.  Although Corky marked an important milestone for 
representations of the disabled, he might not be the first image that comes to mind for 
most Americans, but for me, Down’s Syndrome loomed ever present in my 
understanding of disability.  Corky reminded me of my older twin cousins, who lived just 
down the road from my childhood home.  He also brought to mind the teenager my best 
friend’s mother, an interpreter for the hearing-impaired and an advocate for those who 
our society categorized “special,” had informally adopted as part of her family. While the 
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show presented Corky as a disabled person living the “normal” life of a teenager, it 
perpetuated notions of the disabled as pitiful and innocent.  It also minimized the stigma 
that still characterized the experience of students with Down’s Syndrome and other 
diagnoses that deemed them “disabled.”    
The series was not unlike many other contemporary films, television series, and 
popular comic strips, explored in this chapter, which often seemed to portray disability in 
a positive light but carried an underlying message about the “otherness” of the disabled.  
More importantly, the series served to deemphasize in the public consciousness the (often 
grim) “reality” of living as a student with disabilities.  While the able-bodied community 
heralded the series as a positive exemplar of the inclusive American sitcom, millions of 
real American students with Down’s Syndrome and a host of other disabilities spent their 
days in the isolation of special education “resource” rooms. While the relative popularity 
of Life Goes On seems to express a certain mindset about the need for an inclusive 
curriculum, the history of American education tells another story entirely, and the “dark 
past” of “special” education leaves little uncertainty that disabled bodies have been 
purposefully excluded from the curriculum.  
Before I discuss other popular representations of disability, I want to situate these 
images within a broader understanding of the social experiences of people with 
disabilities.   Like Jenkins, Richardson, and Shattuc (2002), I view these popular texts 
“not as discrete entities that stand alone but instead exist in relation to a broad range of 
other discourses, placing media production and consumption within a vast social and 
cultural configuration of competing voices and positions” (p. 17).  Therefore, it is 
important that we recognize the exclusion of people with disabilities from “mainstream” 
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society (particularly education) for what it was and, in some cases, still is: purposeful and 
appalling.  It is well-known that for nearly a century, the needs of students with 
disabilities were overlooked or ignored by public schools, relegated to the margins, 
isolated. I don’t need to retell the history of institutionalization here; you are undoubtedly 
aware of the way that disabled children, particularly those whose physical abnormalities 
were accompanied by intellectual ones, were relegated to the margins of society, cast 
away, imprisoned.  But let Winzer’s (1993) collection of statistics from her 
comprehensive study of the history of Special Education serve to remind us: 
In 1966 in the United States the per capita cost for mentally retarded persons in 
residential settings was less than five dollars a day (Holburn, 1990). Writers 
presented horrifying illustrated descriptions of conditions in institutions for 
mentally retarded person and juvenile delinquents (Blatt and Kaplan, 1960; 
Rivera, 1972; Vail, 1966).  Photographs showed poorly clothed or naked 
residents, residents in solitary rooms, and large, loudly day rooms smeared with 
excrement on walls, floors and even ceilings (Zigler, Hoddap, and Edison, 1990).  
These “poignant exposes revealed the frequent tragedies in the human condition” 
(Sparr and Smith, 1990), p. 95).  Blatt described institutions for the mentally 
retarded as a “land of the living dead” (Blatt and Kaplan, 1960, p. v). (Winzer 
1993, p. 378) 
 Such disturbing images have characterized the “treatment” of students with 
disabilities for much of the history of public education. In fact, in spite of the mandate for 
inclusion put forth by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 1975, it is 
really only in the last decade that we have seen a significant shift toward fully including 
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students with disabilities in the regular classroom and providing for them the same 
opportunities that “normal” children are entitled to.  By the early 1990s, when Life Goes 
On was reassuring Americans that special education students could take active roles in 
mainstream society, there was nothing that could really be deemed “integration,” in the 
language of the Civil rights movement.  Winzer (1993) recognizes a paradigm shift was 
(and I would argue is still) necessary before significant changes could take place, 
observing that “the ability of a society to provide services to help special people required 
not only the technical and scientific skills to do so, but also a social philosophy that 
recognized exceptionality as a human condition, not simplistically as deviance, 
dependence, or delinquency (p. 365).”  Yet, as Winzer (1993) concludes her study, 
writing just over a decade ago, we find that her concept of changed social philosophy 
reflects humane changes in policy but still embodies the same ideas about the need to 
rehabilitate the disabled toward normalcy:   
The current philosophy underlying special education rejects the idea of merely 
caring for or maintaining persons with disabilities or simply helping them to 
adjust.  Instead, it stresses corrections and prevention and adheres to the notion 
that all children have the right to learn in the educational environment most suited 
to their academic and social needs (p. 383). 
Unfortunately, the educational environment that is most often deemed “most 
suited” to their needs is a separate “special” environment that further stigmatizes these 
students, and the notion of “correction and prevention,” still highly applicable to the 
“treatment” of children with disabilities, perpetuates the hegemony of able-bodied 
culture.  These ideas resonate in what Eli Clare (2001) identifies as four paradigms of 
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disability that have dominated popular perception: the medical, charity, supercrip, and 
moral models.  Clare’s (2001) terms represent the prevailing ways that able-bodied 
American society has responded to disability.  The “medical” model presents disability as 
a pathological condition that must be treated or cured through medical technology so that 
the person can live a “normal” life; the new ABC reality show “Miracle Workers,” in 
which patients with serious medical conditions receive expensive “life-changing” 
medical procedures for free, is good evidence of the prevalence of this assumption.  In 
the tradition of the long-running Jerry Lewis Telethon, the “charity” model emphasizes 
the need to eradicate disabling conditions through generous giving by others.  The 
“supercrip” model depicts the person with a disability as heroic and courageous for 
becoming successful or simply living in spite of his or her condition (think Helen Keller, 
F.D.R, Ray Charles, etc.) and the “moral” model, by Clare’s definition, associates 
disability with moral weakness or depravity (which corresponds with Martin Norden’s 
(1994) “Obsessive Avenger,” an embittered character seeking revenge).  I would add that 
the “moral” model might also include the aggrandizement of the individual to a higher 
moral plane based on his or her disability, as in the staple characters described by Norden 
(1994), the “Sweet Innocent” and the “Saintly Sage.”   
From my own analysis of popular media, I would add what I will call the 
“spectacle” model, in which the disabled body is viewed as exotic or grotesque, which 
brings to mind various media that conflate the “otherness” of disability with “horror.”  
This model is closely tied to another representation, the “comic” model, in which 
disabling conditions are depicted humorously. In recent years, this model has been 
popularized by syndicated comic artists like Gahan Wilson, whose dark images of half-
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dead, macabre, grotesque “monsters” of all sorts (very reminiscent of early horror films), 
have appeared in the New Yorker and other popular periodicals for decades. The cartoons 
of John Callahan, a quadriplegic who became known for his controversial “cripple 
humor” cartoons, and The Far Side creator Gary Larson, whose fictional realm is 
occupied entirely by bulging-eyed, big-nosed, bespectacled, misshapen, and often 
clueless characters, have also sparked heated debates about their comic representations of 
disability.  
These categories, indicative of some of the most common assumptions about 
disability, are not all-inclusive and, as Clare (2001) is quick to note, they intersect and 
overlap, but they can give us some idea of the multiple ways that disability is 
conceptualized through contemporary popular culture.  They can also help us understand 
how these narratives operate to define disability in these popular media.  Holmes (2003) 
observes that they “teach us that disability is “alien, terrifying, tragic; that it transforms 
your life in overwhelmingly negative ways; and that it is normal to feel horrified, 
relieved, and inspired, all from a safe distance, when we encounter disability (Holmes, 
2003, p. ix.).  Here, I want to revisit some disability films that, for me, have most 
horrified, relieved and inspired my understanding of what it means to be disabled.  
Disability in Film and Television 
Let me begin by briefly describing the historical context that preceded the making 
of these recent films.   As we will see, disability has been and continues to be big 
business when it comes to the film industry; as Davis (2002) notes, three of the academy 
award nominated films of 1997 - Shine, The English Patient, and Slingblade – were all 
disability films.  Not long after films emerged as a medium in America, filmmakers 
 73 
began capitalizing on the comic model to release a number of short silent films that 
featured disabled characters. As Safran (1998) notes, “Many early movies used 
disabilities to heighten the effect of slapstick comedies and melodramas, and frequently 
presented the stereotypes of victim or villain, or as seeking revenge for their disability” 
(p. 468).  In fact, the first short film depicting physical disability, Thomas Edison’s 50-
second film, The Fake Beggar, appeared in 1898 (Norden, 1994). The early titles speak 
for themselves: The Legless Runner (1907), The Invalid’s Adventure (1907), and Don’t 
Pull My Leg (1908). An indication of the popularity of this genre, during this era of the 
early development of the film industry, the famed D.W. Griffith directed no less than 14 
films featuring physical and/or sensory impairments (Safran, 1998). 
As the American film industry matured and the general public became more 
sensitive toward the body-altering injuries sustained by soldiers in World War I, the 
medical model became the most popular mode of filmic representations of disability. A 
barrage of “curability” film, including The Silent Voice (1915), Stella Maris (1918), The 
Miracle Man (1919), Big Little Person (1919) and The Shock (1923), all of which 
featured miraculous recoveries, typify the films of this period. The medical model, which 
insists that the body be “fixed” in order to restore it to its “normal” state, is perhaps the 
most pervasive, considering the pathologization of disability:  
Briefly, the medicalization of disability casts human variation as deviance from 
the norm, as pathological condition, as deficit, and significantly, as an individual 
burden and personal tragedy.  Society, in agreeing to assign medical meaning to 
disability, colludes to keep the issue within the purview of the medical 
establishment, to keep it a personal matter and “treat” the condition and the 
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person with the condition rather than “treating” the social processes and policies 
that construct disabled people’s lives (Linton, 1998, p. 11). 
In spite of the popularity of the medical representations of disability during this time, 
some films emerged that expressed underlying messages about the association between 
disability and depravity, such as Flesh and Blood (1922), in which the main character 
disguises himself as a disabled beggar, The Blackbird (1926), whose main character is an 
underworld gang leader posing as a disabled Bishop, and The Unknown (1927), which 
features a armless “freak” show “fake” whose deceit results in the amputation of both  his 
arms.   
Silent film actor Lon Chaney, who played the main characters in each of these 
three films and a host of others, was well-known for his portrayal of strange, disfigured, 
and disabled (or seemingly disabled) characters, and it was he who portrayed the title 
characters in the first film versions of The Hunchback of Notre Dame (1923) and The 
Phantom of the Opera (1925), perhaps two of the most well-known representations of 
disfigurement.  The popularity of these films signaled a gradual shift from a subtle, 
underlying association of disability with immorality to brazen depictions of disability as 
spectacle.  With this shift came the emergence of horror films such as Frankenstein 
(1931) and Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1931) and Freaks (1932).  In general, the films of 
the early decades of the twentieth century helped to construct disability in terms of 
dependence and deviance:   
Moviemakers would have their audiences believe that helplessness and 
dependency on ablebodied people were the norms for physically disabled people, 
and that if they weren’t cured, or at the very least kept dependent, they were 
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dangerous deviants. If in the movies disabled characters showed their worthiness 
through some combination of good deeds, innocence, spirituality, and a general 
long-suffering life, and weren’t elderly, they would probably return to the 
mainstream world – their ultimate “reward,” as it were – through a cure (Norden, 
1994, p. 105-106). 
The World War II era ushered in more sensitive portrayals, reminiscent of both 
the “medical” and “supercrip” trends in response to the growing number of disabled 
veterans:  Pride of the Marines (1945) and Bright Victory (1951) both featured characters 
blinded in service. In The Best Years of Our Lives (1946) veteran Harold Russell, whose 
hands had been replaced by metal hooks, portrayed himself.  Another well-known film, 
Fred Zinnemann’s The Men (1950), depicted veterans who had become paraplegics 
(Norden, 1994).  These films tended to be hopeful depictions of people coming to terms 
with their disabilities, relying also on the assumptions that disability is overcome through 
the selfless giving (charity) of others (in most cases, beautiful women).  Other later “feel-
good” films, including Interrupted Melody (1955), the true story of opera singer Marjorie 
Lawrence overcoming polio, and Sunrise at Campobello (1960), which chronicled 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s polio “triumph,” followed this medical/ supercrip model.  The 
story of Helen Keller, The Miracle Worker (1962), which details how Keller 
miraculously manages to overcome multiple disabilities to eke out some semblance of a 
“normal” existence, is yet another example.   
 In contrast, the long Vietnam era sparked its own collection of disability 
depictions, but these films had a decidedly different tone.  The well-known Stanley 
Kubrick film, Dr. Strangelove (1964), with its unforgettable portrayal of the maniacal 
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wheelchair-bound Dr. with the mechanical arm, was among the first of many anti-war 
themed films. By relating these images of disability to the controversial Vietnam conflict, 
these films offered a subtle moral message: both Johnny Got His Gun (1971) and Coming 
Home (1978), as well as the later Born on the Fourth of July (1989), offered grim 
depictions of physical disability and an anti-war message.  In response to the increased 
number of soldiers experiencing “psychological” casualties as a result of the war, the 
post-Vietnam era saw a flood of films that addressed mental disabilities in frightening 
and macabre portrayals, including One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975), Taxi Driver 
(1976), The Other Side of Hell (1978), The Deer Hunter (1978) and Apocalypse Now 
(1979).  
Interestingly enough, films with disability themes rarely featured children with 
disabilities, and it wasn’t until the civil rights era was well underway that people with 
disabilities were consistently depicted as living independently in “mainstream” society in 
films like Tell Me That You Love Me Junie Moon (1970), in which a woman disfigured 
by burns ventures out into society with her two disabled friends.  This period also saw a 
resurgence of “disabled hero” themes with films such as The Other Side of the Mountain 
(1975), in which a champion skier comes to terms with paralysis. 
It was also during this era that people with disabilities began to make their way 
onto the small screen. In the years that preceded the civil rights era, as television 
established itself as the new medium for the masses, Chester Goode, the loyal deputy on 
the first nine seasons of Gunsmoke (1955-1975) was only noteworthy representation of 
disability.  In 1967, we saw the first character with a disability in a title role in the 
Wheelchair dependent detective, Robert T. Ironside in Ironside (1967-1975).  A few 
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years later, he was joined by James Fransiscus, a blind insurance investigator on 
Longstreet (1971-1972).  Each of these characters ascribe to “supercrip” assumptions 
about disability, and it is interesting to note that none of these three popular characters 
suffered from a congenital condition, but received the injuries that led to their disabilities 
at the hands of others.  
Similarly, former astronaut Steve Austin, The Six Million Dollar Man (1974-
1978) became disabled as a result of a spaceship crash, but was able to obtain 
superhuman qualities by being rebuilt as a cyborg.  The popular series spawned a spin-off 
involving his former love-interest, Jaime Sommers, in The Bionic Woman (1976-1978).  
Sommers’ body was also rebuilt after a near-fatal sky-diving accident.  Perhaps the only 
congenitally disabled recurring character was the blind chief Engineer Lt. Geordi 
LaForge, who appeared in Star Trek: The Next Generation (1987-1994) and subsequent 
films.  LaForge’s disabililty was “corrected” through technology; he wore a futuristic 
device called a V.I.S.O.R. (Visual Instrument and Sensory Organ Replacement), which 
enabled him to see a broader range of electromagnetic radiation than most humans, but he 
eventually received ocular implants that allowed him to discontinue the use of the device 
and regain a “normal” appearance.  These development of these characters primarily 
about medical assumptions about disability; they imply that the characters’ quality of life 
would have suffered if not for the ability-enhancing technology that transformed them 
into bionic superheroes.   
Beyond these few enduring characters, there have been a few other notable roles 
actually portrayed by actors with disabilities, including Chris Burke and Marlee Matlin, 
who, after winning an Oscar for her role in Children of a Lesser God, joined the TV 
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series Picket Fences (1992-1996).  In general, however, people with disabilities have 
been largely underrepresented on television.  While the ongoing debate over the 
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 moved disability rights further into the public 
consciousness, this shift was not reflected in the television industry, and this continues to 
be the case.  The two noteworthy characters currently appearing in successful series, Dr. 
David Robbins on the CBS drama, CSI, and Dr. Gregory House on the Fox series, House, 
both walk with a limp and use a cane.  While the disability of Dr. David Robbins (played 
by Robert David Hall, an actual double amputee) is not significant to the story line, the 
disabling injury of Dr. House is a major part of the conflict involving this embittered 
physician, who suffers from chronic pain.  Considering the vast numbers of Americans 
who have disabilities, which Davis (2002) estimates to be 15 to 20 percent of the 
population even without the baby boomers, two doctors with canes grossly minimizes the 
presence of people with disabilities in our country.   
While disabled characters remain largely absent from television, films have 
continued to draw on the standard assumptions about disability in the numerous 
representations that have appeared since the 1980s.  One of the most memorable images 
from my childhood was that of The Elephant Man (1980), with its grotesque 
representation of disfigurement and underlying message about charity.  Since that time, a 
myriad of motion pictures have depicted a wide range of disabilities: autism in Rain Man 
(1988) and What’s Eating Gilbert Grape (1993), AIDS in Philadelphia (1993), blindness 
in At First Sight (1997) and Ray (2004), disfigurement in The English Patient (1993), The 
Man Without a Face (1993) and Vanilla Sky (2001), cancer in One True Thing (1998) and 
Stepmom (1998), congenital physical conditions in Simon Birch (1998) and The Mighty 
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(1998) and learning disabilities in Sling Blade (1996) and I Am Sam (2001), and the list 
could continue on for several pages.  The depictions of people with disabilities in these 
films are as varied as the conditions they address, ranging from asexual innocence to 
angry bittnerness to deviant immorality, and while many of them attempt to do justice to 
disability in their realistic representations, most still seem to embody one or more of the 
traditional assumptions about disability. 
Edward Scissorhands 
Within this group of contemporary disability films are two figures that loom large 
in the collective cultural consciousness and in my personal mental inventory of disability 
representations.  The first is Edward Scissorhands (1990), which might easily be 
regarded as the Generation X’s Frankenstein with a sensitive, comic twist. This Tim 
Burton film was released just as I preparing to enter the cruel, strange world of high 
school, a time when adolescent fears of isolation and “otherness” were reaching their 
zenith.  Perhaps it was both this timeliness and later, the film’s enduring presence on 
TBS, that made the images of Edward’s garden-shear hands, sunken eyes, and wiry mess 
of black hair so unforgettable.  As an “artificial” person, Scissorhands may not, on first 
glance, appear to portray traditional notions of disability, but  as Enns and Smit (2001) 
point out, disability does not have an easily recognized, coherent form.  Rather, the 
disability is defined in relation to what is perceived as a lack of human potential, so that 
the category of disability becomes a distorted reflection of what society considers 
“normal” and “human.” Scissorhands certainly provides a telling reflection of 
assumptions about humanity and normalcy.  Edward is the creation of an ambitious 
inventor who died before he could craft hands to replace the set of rotating scissors.  He 
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exists happily in complete isolation in the Gothic mansion belonging to his creator, but 
his problems begin when Peg Boggs stops by on an Avon sales call.  Boggs takes pity on 
him and brings him home with her to 1950s Suburbia.  At first, Edward finds himself 
subject to the fearful and curious scrutiny of the neighborhood, but his shrub and hair-
cutting talents quickly elevate him to celebrity status.  However, Edward’s experience in 
mainstream society soon takes a negative turn; his love for Peg’s daughter, Kim, is 
unrequited, and an accident in which he unintentionally harms another person is 
interpreted as a malicious act, forcing him to return to exile indefinitely. 
Norden (1994), in his comprehensive history of physical disability in films, gives 
American film the moniker, “Cinema of Isolation,” because more often than not, 
characters with disabilities are set apart, portrayed as outsiders.  This is certainly true of 
Edward Scissorhands and many of the other films mentioned here.  Edward Scissorhands 
also embodies a number of other traditional assumptions about disabled bodies and what 
it means to be “normal.”  Peg feels sorry for Edward, and it is her charity that brings him 
into Suburbia, based on Burton’s own childhood Burbank, which he describes as 
“disembodied” (Ansen, 1991).  Edward quickly becomes a spectacle, a “freak” to be 
studied by the curious eyes of the “normal” people, but his unique talents make him a 
hero (supercrip).  However, Edward, longing so much to touch, to engage in normalcy, is 
unable to control his disability, and his weakness is interpreted by society as depravity.  
Caroline Thompson, the screenwriter for the film, says of Burton’s character in 
Newsweek, “It’s the perfect metaphor for how many of us feel.  It’s more than feeling like 
an outsider, it’s feeling dangerous . . . yearning to touch and knowing when you do, you 
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destroy” (Ansen, 1991).  In the end, we are left wondering if he would have been better 
off left in isolation, where society felt he really “belonged” in the first place.  
In my initial readings of this film, I perceived primarily the pain and isolation that 
accompanied Edward’s otherness, and those feelings appealed to my own insecurities 
about navigating the murky waters between what I have understood as the isolation of 
intellectualism and the attachment to mainstream cultural norms.  However, I think that 
Edward Scissorhands holds some important insights into the way we construct disability 
and how those constructions operate in an environment that is similar to Burton’s 
disembodied Suburbia, namely, the school.  The neighborhood of neatly situated, tackily 
decorated tract homes is not unlike the sterile classroom, with its neatly-lined desks and 
pre-fabricated posters.  Edward, with his childlike uncertainty, unsteady gait, black attire, 
and complicated appendages, stands out monstrously against this backdrop of repressed 
tidiness.  Like Edward, students with disabilities, particularly perceived physical and 
mental differences, complicate the “tidy” environment of the “regular” classroom.  Like 
Edward’s human hosts, we are fearful and suspicious of “others” who cannot control their 
minds and bodies the way that the able do; we may “tolerate” those that are different but, 
like Edward’s friends, our apparent friendship may only be a mask for our underlying 
fear and misunderstanding.   Edward is truly “disabled” in the Suburban environment, 
with its numerous physical and social barriers.  From Edward’s demise we learn that 
having the appearance of accepting difference is not the same as embracing difference 
and changing the fabric of society to allow for those differences.  
Burton, himself a self-proclaimed alienated artist, clearly has something to say 
about the way American society responds to difference, with his construction of “an 
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uneasy sense that the surface gregariousness of middle-class life can quickly turn 
threatening” (Ansen, 1991, p. 58).  Yet, the viewing audience is left to accept Edward’s 
fate and to understand physical difference as “alien, terrifying, tragic,” to assume that 
those who fail to embrace the nuances of disembodied normalcy (in which bodily 
entanglements are kept at a safe distance), those whose differences are beyond their 
control, should be kept in isolation.  We comfort ourselves with the assumption that 
students with disabilities are better off not being exposed to the selfishness, 
maliciousness, and fearfulness of mainstream society. 
Forrest Gump 
Another unforgettable character, Forrest Gump (1994), shares Scissorhands’ 
naiveté about the brutish qualities of mainstream society, but his narrative follows a 
somewhat different path.  This huge box-office hit centers on the life of a mildly mentally 
(and in the beginning, physically) disabled Alabama man who wanders innocently 
through the major historical events of the 60s and 70s and inadvertently finds personal 
and financial success.  Like Edward, Forrest embodies more than one of the traditional 
assumptions about people with disabilities. When we first meet Forrest, we find that, in 
keeping with the “medical” model of disability, he must endure painful leg braces in 
order to straighten his legs and allow for a “normal” appearance.  The braces, in turn, are 
an outwardly visible sign of his disabilities and cause him to become a spectacle, an 
object of ridicule by cruel children and adults alike.  Nevertheless, Forrest is blissfully 
unaware of the malice and disgust with which he is regarded, and in contrast to 
Scissorhands, whose lack of understanding and restraint results in questionable moralilty, 
Gump is morally elevated as a result of his simplicity, the archetype of Norden’s (1994) 
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“Sweet Innnocent.” Unlike Scissorhands, who eyes are inevitably opened to the cruelty of 
humanity, Forrest remains oblivious to reality, and the other characters go to great length 
to protect his child-like “purity”; his mother even sleeps with the school superintendent to 
keep him in a regular classroom.  Her desperate act emphasizes her desire to maintain 
Forrest’s persona of normalcy, whatever the cost.  In fact, while Forrest is viewed as the 
epitome of a “good” person because he lacks the ability to impose judgment on others, he 
never has to make any moral choices like those faced by other characters in the film.  
Like Peg, it is primarily a mainstream mother-figure, Jenny, who offers charity in the 
form of friendship, and like Edward, it is Forrest’s special “talents” (in this case, his 
knack for running and ping-pong) that propel him into celebrity (supercrip) status.  
Forrest also falls in love in the film, and although his childlike adoration for Jenny offers 
none of the complexities of “normal” adult relationships, he does eventually (although 
somewhat inadvertently, consummate his relationship with her, resulting in a child (who, 
incidentally does not share Forrest’s disability). 
Isolation and Inclusion 
When juxtaposed, these two characters construct a telling binary between two 
major issues in special education:  isolation and inclusion.  The message that these two 
films seem to offer is that the inclusion of people with disabilities into mainstream 
society can work if those people have an outwardly “normal” appearance, are innocent 
and asexual, require no adaptations, and pose no threat to our own insecurities about 
ourselves.  The two characters, both framed as outsiders, are radically different in the 
ways that they navigate mainstream society.  Edward is acutely aware of the fact that the 
scissors make him different, and his awareness only further inhibits him from engaging in 
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appropriate social interactions.  He also engages in purposeful moral choices, although 
those choices only lead him to discover the pain of betrayal and deceit, and result in his 
loss of innocence.  Once corrupted, he is no longer “good” in the eyes of the Suburbanites 
and must return to isolation.   
In comparison, Forrest Gump certainly seems to convey the more positive 
message about accepting difference, but that acceptance comes with a price. In Forrest’s 
case, the success of his mainstream experiences seem to hinge on the fact that although 
Forrest admits that he is “not a smart man,” he believes his mother when she insisted, 
“You're no different than anybody else is.”  In that sense, Forrest is as ignorant about his 
own uniqueness as he is the larger social context in which he is living.  He need not be 
concerned with the potential obstacles faced by people with mental disabilities because 
he manages to float easily through life like the metaphorical feather (an important aspect 
of the film’s imagery).  Forrest becomes accepted, even celebrated, by mainstream 
society, but the messages that he embodies are potentially regressive ones.  Forrest, 
parroting his mother, espouses the belief that “You have to do the best with what God 
gave you” and the ever-famous “Life is like a box of chocolates.  You never know what 
you’re gonna get.”  This leaves the viewer to assume that when it comes to those who 
society has deemed disabled, apparently the best you can do is throw yourself into 
society, pretend you’re no different, and hope for the best, and maybe, like Forrest, you 
will be rewarded with fame and fortune.   
Examined together, these two films offer important insight into current issues 
surrounding the education of students with disabilities.  Since the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 specified that students with disabilities should be 
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educated with their non-disabled peers “to the maximum extent appropriate,” public 
school systems have slowly moved away from the traditional segregated model toward 
integrating those students classroom versions of Edward’s Suburbia, complete with their 
own disembodied repressiveness and long-standing norms.  The passage of the 1990 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which Congressional amendments renamed the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in 1997, added to the urgency of 
what widely became known as “inclusion.” According to the most recent statistics 
released by the U.S Department of Education (2003), nearly half of all students with 
disabilities (46.5 percent of more than 5 million students) are being educated in the 
regular classroom for most of the school day (79 percent or greater).    
The issues that have risen from this shift are highlighted in the characters of 
Scissorhands and Gump.  Like the Suburbanites, many educators are fearful of the bodily 
entanglements that often accompany students with disabilities.  They want to keep the 
instructional and social norms they are comfortable with in place.   Consider the 
perspective on the inclusion of disabilities expressed in a New York Times Magazine 
article: 
On children’s television, the kid in the wheelchair has become a kind of mascot, 
beloved by all his gang.  But imagine a real-life classroom where all of the 
children are nondisabled except the one who drools uncontrollably, who hears 
voices or can’t read a simple sentence when everyone else can.  Diversity is a 
noble ideal.  But many disabled children would be marginalized and ridiculed in 
the mainstream . . .(Staples, 1999, quoted in Smith and Kozleski, 2005).  
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The character of Edward Scissorhands seems to uphold this regressive outlook on 
disability, the idea that some students are just better off in the Gothic mansions of 
separate facilities and isolated resource rooms. We use the marginalization and ridicule of 
students who are “different” as an excuse to keep them at a distance, which keeps us from 
mussing up our tidy educational environments with something as vilified as human 
saliva.   
 If Edward Scissorhands symbolizes what is “right” about isolation, then Forrest 
Gump represents what is wrong with inclusion, not the concept itself, but our 
misconceptions about what it means to be inclusive.  Thanks in large part to the 
persistence of his mother, Forrest participated fully in mainstream society, and he was 
readily accepted once he left behind the vestiges of perceivable physical disability.  Aside 
from the sacrifices of his mother, no special accommodations were required of American 
society in order for Forrest to drift through a blissfully ordinary life.  Just as Forrest was 
embraced by society, we as educators are somewhat more likely to accept students whose 
disabilities do not force us to confront our own bodily inadequacies, students who can 
otherwise be perceived as “normal.”  In fact, despite his IQ of 75, Gump was heralded by 
fans of the film as representative of the “ordinary” person.  Perhaps more importantly, 
Forrest’s experience would leave us to believe that if we simply allow students access to 
the mainstream environment of the general education classroom and tell them, as 
Forrest’s dear Mama told him, “You’re the same as everybody else.  You are no 
different,” then the students, not realizing that they are different, will be successful and 
everyone will be happy.  Unfortunately, it seems that this perspective has characterized 
“inclusion” in many cases; the constitution of general education classes have changed 
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with the addition of students with disabilities but the instructional and interpersonal 
norms have remained the same (Baglieri and Knopf, 2004).  We may have removed the 
logistical barriers that prevented students with disabilities from accessing the curriculum, 
but the socially constructed assumptions about disability, reflected in our popular media, 
have remained intact.    
These memorable film characters, along with the larger cinematic context from 
which they emerged provide us with some understanding of how such popular culture 
texts have written the disabled body out of and into educational practice. Norden (1994) 
notes that “As powerful cultural tools, the movies have played a major role in 
perpetuating mainstream society’s regard for people with disabilities, and more than not 
the images borne in those movies have differed sharply from the realities of the 
physically disabled experience. (p. 1).  As Holmes (2003) notes, these narratives teach us 
that it’s okay to feel horrified, relieved or inspired, whether we encounter disability in 
films or in our everyday lives.  As Holmes (2003) observes, the “objection here is not 
with any of these feelings, per se, but with the fact that there are so few others suggested 
by the textual and visual narratives that train us how to picture, talk about, and enact the 
relationships to our own and others’ bodies shaped by the able-disabled binary” (Holmes, 
2003, p. ix). In the case of the films discussed here, the representations of disability have 
become a part of the broader cultural system; these films provide a safe space in which 
we can explore our bodily fears from a safe distance.  As Ryan and Kellner (1988) note, 
they play an important role in shaping social reality, in this case, the able-disabled binary: 
Films transcode the discourses (the forms, figures, and representations) of social 
life into cinematic narrative.  Rather than reflect a reality external to the film 
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medium, films execute a transfer from one discursive field to another.  As a result, 
films themselves become a part of that broader cultural system of representations 
that construct social reality.  That construction occurs in part through the 
internalization of representations (pp. 12-13). 
Thus, the process through which we construct the “otherness” of disability occurs 
through simultaneous acts of construction and internalization. 
Films featuring people with disabilities have not only shaped social reality, but 
the economy of the film industry as well.  In contrast to the Oscar buzz that has been 
generated over numerous portrayals of disability (most recently Million Dollar Baby 
(2004), Ray (2004), The Hours (2002), A Beautiful Mind (2001), I am Sam (2001)), 
primetime television hasn’t exerted a great deal of effort to feature actors or characters 
with disabilities. As Davis (1994) notes, “although considerable effort has been expended 
on the part of activists, legislators, and scholars, disability is still a largely ignored and 
marginalized area.  Every week, films and television programs are made containing the 
most egregious stereotypes of people with disabilities, and hardly anyone notices” 
(Davis, p. 159).  In fact, with a little online research, one can find a lengthy list of 
television shows that have addressed disabilities in some way, and discover that few 
characters are in leading roles, and many of them are single, impoverished, oppressed, or 
worse, fodder for comedy skits.  For the most part television has not successfully created 
many memorable characters that can be seen as ordinary people with human needs.   
Life Goes On 
This brings us back to Corky.  Looking back on the history of film and television 
portrayals of disability, Life Goes On seems to stand out as a marginally successful 
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attempt to disable “otherness” through a lead role. Although the series, with its upbeat 
theme song and saccharine tone, was not entirely practical when it came to the realities of 
mainstreaming in America, it did portray some of the social challenges Corky faced in his 
interactions as a student, and later, a husband.  Yet, the title of the series Life Goes On 
suggests a theme much like Forrest Gump:  You do the best with what God gave you.  
Life goes on in spite of being different. And in Corky’s case, life largely went on without 
him as the show shifted the primary focus to the titillating storyline involving the 
characters portrayed by Kelly Martin and Chad Lowe. This is what we say when we have 
to face tragedy: life goes on, because it has to, because there are some things that are 
beyond our control. 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, a prolific writer in disability studies, says,  “We 
want to redefine, to re-imagine, disability – not make it go away.  But also not have it 
remain with its stigmatic force.  So we want it to go away in a way that we want it to go 
away.” (Rosemarie Garland-Thomson in Brueggemann et. Al, 2005, p. 13).  Similarly, I 
want to redefine, re-imagine this Life Goes On portrayal of disability.  For as long as we 
maintain the “in spite of,” the able-disable binary persists.  To say that life goes on in 
spite of being different implies that it is a tragedy to be overcome, like the death of a 
loved one.  Sometimes being different is tragic, but it is not inherent to the body of the 
person who falls short of what society calls “normal;” it is in the specular gaze, the 
socially constructed perceptions that have been reified overtime.  To say that life goes on 
is to say that our lives are beyond our control, and certainly there are things that a single 
body cannot change, but we need to recognize the power we have to construct disability.  
We have to recognize that “disability” actually has more to do with the way we have 
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constructed “our” society based on what works for the able.  Chris Burke, like his 
character, was imbued with self-confidence, bolstered by supportive parents and 
professional success, which carried him through the complexities of mainstream life, 
while Forrest Gump was satisfied simply believing he was “no different and being 
unaware of the oppression that formed the context of his experiences (the Civil Rights 
Movement, Vietnam), but expecting people with disabilities simply to believe in 
themselves requires no effort on our part.  As with the example of inclusion, we cannot 
simply open the door and expect equality to magically materialize.  We have to change 
the way we think: about difference, about disabilities, about bodies.   
Before we can expect to see genuine change in the way that we approach the 
education of those whose minds and bodies do not conform to standards of normalcy, we 
have to begin thinking differently about disability; we must question the hegemony of the 
normal and begin to see ourselves as being “differently abled.” In all our rhetoric about 
equality, about tolerance and acceptance, we might think that to do so would not require a 
conceptual leap.  But Davis (1994) tells us otherwise:  we have only begun to rethink the 
disabled body; in cultural studies we have romanticized transgressive bodies, but disabled 
bodies have not yet begun to participate in "the erotics of power, in the power of the 
erotic, in economies of transgression . . . There has been no rhetoric tied to prostheses, 
wheelchairs, colostomy bags, cane or leg braces” (p.158).   
Engaging Cultural Bodies 
Thus, when it comes to interpreting and engaging in popular culture, we need to 
bring disability more fully into our critical pedagogies.  We have a responsibility as 
members and educators of a vast audience to interrogate representations of disability and 
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seek out the ways they operate to shape our social and educational realities.  As Stump 
(2002) poignantly notes,  
There is far too much fear, hatred, and misery in this world, much of which is 
brought about by a lack of understanding and sympathy for people or groups of 
people who are different from ourselves.  It is important that we, as the motion 
picture audience, become literate filmgoers, able to recognize even the subtlest 
projection of discrimination or prejudice in the films we watch and react to 
accordingly (p. 2002).  
It is easy to allow films or television shows to wash over us and validate our own sense of 
normalcy, but interrogating our own readings, seeking multiple readings in order to 
deconstruct normalcy is a challenge.  As Daspit and Weaver (2000) explain, “It means we 
purposely seek out those voices that do not fit our world view or our readings of popular 
culture texts (xix). Davis (1994) asserts that we can bring these multiple readings into the 
classroom by  
highlighting narratives, lyrics, and representations of disability in literature 
courses, teaching the politics of disability in courses that deal with social and 
political issues, making conscious efforts to include people with disabilities in the 
media, and so on. Important as well would be the attempt to teach disability 
across the curriculum so that this subject does not remain ghettoized in special 
courses. This aspect of inclusion involves a reshaping of symbolic cultural 
productions and ideology (p. 159). 
If we imagine a reconceptualization of disability, it must involve this reshaping of the 
symbolic ideology represented by popular culture.  The initiation of these multiple 
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readings should not occur because we feel sorry for people who are challenged by our 
models of mental and/or physical normalcy, but because whether or not we like to admit 
it, “ability” is situational, transient, and artificial.  Instead of hypostatizing normalcy 
through traditional interpretations of disability, we need to resituate our readings in terms 
of the continuum of human ability. 
Although I am now “able” in terms of the barriers I face in my life, constructions 
of normalcy have profoundly shaped my thoughts, my actions, my body.  I have to 
assume that my immersion in the competing media of films, television, music, 
magazines, literature, and the World Wide Web has something to do with my bodily 
neuroses, so the desire to rewrite normalcy is personal for me.  I have engaged, still 
engage, in “body-centric thinking” that reflects a culture constructed by the able, for the 
able, a paradigm that needs shifting. However, to overturn the hegemony of the normal, 
to rethink the body, does not mean erasing difference.  As Brenda Brueggmann (2005) 
says, “I think somehow our social goal is not to erase disability, not even to normalize it, 
but somehow to make it just one of the many aspects of who we are” (p. 15).  This is 
what Life Goes On represents for me.  Life does not go on in spite of difference.  Life is 
difference. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE BODY BITES BACK: 
THE A.D.D. EPIDEMIC 
 
  Let me begin by telling you how this chapter was written.  First of all, not one 
word of was transferred from my brain, where it had been circulating intermittently for 
two years, until two weeks before it had to be finished.  Once the writing process began 
for this and every chapter, this is basically how it happens:  Turn music on, read, quote, 
write, turn music off, click on high-speed internet browser, check email, reply to email, 
read, quote, write conclusion I just thought of, turn music back on (different genre), 
rearrange quotes, check a reference online, add a reference I forgot, read text message, 
reply to text message, snack, read, think, take deep breaths to slow racing heart (stress), 
quote, write, answer cell phone, reorganize articles, go home, fix coffee, fix snack for 
children, change music, think, imagine screenplay to accompany music, cry, write 
introduction I just thought of, music off, check online account balance, drag books and 
laptop to bed, turn television on, check weather online, read, quote, write, turn television 
off, turn music back on, rearrange more quotes, read, fall asleep.  And as if the electronic 
distractions aren’t enough to disrupt my hyper-stimulated writing sessions, I have to 
constantly filter all the responsibilities of full-time work and motherhood that appear like 
unwanted pop-ups waiting for a response (What about the laundry?  When is that project 
due for work?  Wasn’t there something you were supposed to sign and send back to 
school?  When does your morning duty start?).  Perhaps, then, one can see that my 
interest in attention deficit, like the other issues of the body I am exploring here, is 
personal.   
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As an adult, I can relate to many of the characteristics physicians use to diagnose 
what is often referred to as ADD; I am highly visual, a perfectionist, easily distracted, a 
chronic procrastinator, easily frustrated by mundane tasks, and my brain seems to be 
working overtime even in my sleep.  So, I undertook this exploration of what is officially 
known now as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) partly because I hope to 
better understand my own apparent neuroses.  More importantly, however, I want to 
understand what the future might hold for those who may share the diagnosis of the 
medicated children who entered my classroom each day, children whose deep confusion 
about their bodies glistened in their questioning eyes.  Children diagnosed with ADHD 
are bodies in the margins of a standardized curriculum, and I believe that this condition 
illustrates the complexities of transactional human bodies and some of the problems that 
can arise from a disembodied curriculum.  
 First, what is ADHD and how has it come to be a fixture of American life? 
ADHD has been described in many ways by various medical “experts,” but I want to 
begin with Wired writer Evan Schwartz’s (1994) description best because it captures so 
vividly my daily experience living as a distracted adult in an information-saturated 
society:  
Anxious to avoid boredom, those afflicted are constantly scanning their 
environment, searching for all things captivating. They may read lots of books, 
but they finish few. They misplace things and require constant reminders. They 
are risk takers, thrill seekers, and, often, caffeine addicts. They are news junkies 
and channel-clicker/cable-surfers. In conversation, they often detour into 
parenthetical tangents, never returning to the main point. On the Net, they can't 
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help getting lost in cyberspace for hours . . . They juggle too many projects and 
are chronically late.  But when something grabs their full attention, they can 
launch into hyperfocus marathons that last well into the night (“Interrupt-Driven, 
June 1994). 
Indeed, Schwartz might be describing almost any postmodern American who operates 
from within the complex network of hyper-connectivity.  Indeed, this “interrupt-driven” 
state, as Schwartz calls it, has emerged as a uniquely (although not exclusively) 
American phenomenon.  ADHD expert Edward Hallowell, author of a bestseller called 
Driven to Distraction, actually heralds the condition as “a riveting new metaphor for our 
cultural milieu” (1997), while Schwartz (1994) himself has dubbed it both the “Yuppie 
Flu of the 90’s and the “official brain syndrome of the information age.”  
 While some adults have sought medical treatment for this condition as awareness 
of ADHD in children has increased, it seems that most “wired” adults accept this constant 
state of distraction as little more than a sign of the times. The numbers of adults 
diagnosed with ADHD still remains fairly small as compared to the ever-increasing 
population of school-aged children who have been labeled with the condition.  Perhaps it 
easy for adults, many of whom have grown accustomed to the daily distractions of multi-
tasking, to entertain these glib indications of the prevalence of ADHD, but the realities of 
our children are not as laughable.  Each day, millions of students who were once resistant 
to our attempts at colonizing them now begin their morning with a pill so that they can 
languish in compliance. Over time, these children come to understand that there is 
something wrong with them, that “normalcy,” however it may be constructed, must be 
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maintained at all costs. What are these bodies, the bodies we are teaching each day, trying 
to teach us? 
The Pathology of ADHD 
What the medical community has taught us is that ADHD is a mental disorder, a 
deficiency, an abnormal state that can be a great inconvenience in a traditional classroom 
setting. The “official” definition of ADD/ADHD in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) describes the symptoms of the 
conditions in as they are expressed through patterns in lack of motor control, impulsivity, 
and difficulties in organizing and focusing. Although the figures vary somewhat 
depending on the source, it is clear that the condition is neither isolated nor uncommon.  
Currently, the U.S. Department of Education (2005) estimates that between 3 and 5 
percent of children have ADHD, which accounts for about 2 million children in the 
United States. The estimates from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2006), 
which accounts for all children ages 4 to 17, is higher: 8 percent or about 4.4 million.  
Whatever the exact number may be these disquieting figures make it clear that 
“epidemic” is an apt description of what has been deemed a “neurobiological disorder.”   
When and where and how ADHD “began” has been debated among various 
groups.  In an effort to “legitimize” the condition by writing it into medical history, many 
articles and web sites advocating for those diagnosed with the condition have pointed to 
the poetry of Dr. Heinrich Hoffman, a physician who wrote books on medicine and 
psychiatry, and began writing children’s poetry for his own young son. Hoffman 
compiled a series of poems he wrote about children and their characteristics into a 
collection that featured "The Story of Fidgety Philip," who can’t sit still in his chair at 
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dinner and eventually turns the chair over, taking the tablecloth and everything on top of 
it with him.   Although this short depiction describes only one of the characteristics said 
to define the condition – hyperactivity – ADHD advocates have heralded the story as an 
“accurate” depiction of a child with the disorder.   
Advocates also point to a series of lectures to the Royal College of Physicians in 
England, published by Sir George F. Still (1902), in which he described a group of 
children with behavioral problems that he attributed to a genetic dysfunction, as proof 
that the condition existed largely unrecognized before its sudden explosion in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.   Another precedent was set when the term “organic drivenness” 
was coined in the 1930s and physician Charles Bradley prescribed Benzadrine to control 
hyperactivity (Diller, 1998, Armstrong, 1995).  In the 1950s, the term “minimal brain 
dysfunction” was used to describe a variety of symptoms related to brain injury, which 
included “excessive restlessness” (Armstrong, 1995). However, it wasn’t until 1980 that 
the American Psychiatric Association recognized the disorder, which, according to 
Armstrong (1995), has gone through 25 name changes in the past century.  It first began 
to permeate the public consciousness after the publication of Barbara Ingersoll’s Your 
Hyperactive Child, in which she suggested a drug regimen as a suitable treatment for 
hyperactivity.  In 1993, Peter Kramer, in Listening to Prozac, coined the term “cosmetic 
pharmacology,” which signaled the marked shift toward treating non-debilitating 
“neurobiological” disorders with psychotropic medications.  Then, in 1994, Edward M. 
Hallowell and John J. Ratey unveiled Driven to Distraction: Recognizing and Coping 
with Attention Deficit Disorder from Childhood to Adulthood, which opened with the 
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words, “Once you catch on to what this syndrome is all about, you’ll see it everywhere.” 
(p. 3) 
Hallowell’s almost giddy depiction of ADD and his willing endorsement of 
Ritalin sparked a debate about the over-diagnosis and treatment of a largely 
unsubstantiated condition.  Multiple-intelligence scholar Thomas Armstrong (1995) 
added his contribution with The Myth of the ADD Child, in which he questioned scientific 
claims and what he called the “pathologizing” of normal children.  Others followed: 
Physician Lawrence H. Diller (1998) with Running on Ritalin and Richard DeGrandpre’s 
(1999) Ritalin Nation:  Rapid-Fire Culture and the Transformation of Human 
Consciousness.  In the wake of these publications, Washington writer Mary Eberstadt 
bluntly asked in Policy Review the question that was lingering in the minds of many: 
How has it come to pass that in fin-de-siecle America, where every child from 
preschool onward can recite the “anti-drug” catechism by heart, millions of 
middle-and upper-middle class children are being legally drugged with a 
substance so similar to cocaine that, as one journalist accurately summarized the 
science, “it takes a chemist to tell the difference”? (p. 24). 
In 1991, the U.S. Department of Education qualified children diagnosed with ADD as 
eligible for special education services, and as awareness of the condition increased, the 
debate over using stimulants like Ritalin to treat Attention Deficit Disorder garnered 
considerable attention. Just when the advocacy group Children and Adults with Attention 
Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder (CHADD) had petitioned the DEA to make the drug 
more readily available by changing its classification as a Schedule II drug, it was 
revealed on television that the group had received $900,000 in undisclosed funds from 
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the Ritalin giant Ciby-Geigy (now Novartis).  Although the DEA denied the request, the 
production of Ritalin continued to soar, increasing by 400 percent from 1990 to 1995 
alone, resulting in an abundance of the drug, 90 percent of which is consumed in the 
United States (Eberhardt 1999).  With the increased availability of psychotropic 
medication came a new era of accommodations:  the 1990s also saw the emergence of 
ADD-based requests for extra time on college and graduate level standardized tests, 
including the SAT, LSAT, and the MCAT (Diller 1998).  In 1999, the Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission (EEOC) also issued guidelines for accommodating employees 
diagnosed with the condition. 
In spite of the rapid mobilization of the medical community to treat the condition, 
no consensus could be reached about how to diagnose it. While many physicians, 
including Hallowell (1994) have observed that like many conditions, ADHD tends to run 
in families, diagnosis of the condition continues to be highly subjective, based on 
behaviors documented by teachers such as fidgeting, distractedness, impatience, blurting, 
disorganization, not listening, etc.   In 1998, the National Institutes of Health organized a 
conference with hundreds of participants and a panel of doctors and educators, but no 
agreement could be made on how to diagnose the disorder (Eberstadt, 1999).  Although 
much research has been conducted in an effort to find a genetic predisposition for the 
condition or link the diagnosis of ADHD to some significant difference in brain function, 
numerous studies have yet to produce any substantive evidence. The most commonly 
cited evidence for ADHD as a physiological condition is a 1990 study, conducted by 
Alan Zametkin at National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), which appeared in New 
England Journal of Medicine. Zametkin found a difference in the rates of glucose 
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metabolism, but as Diller (1998) observes, a series of later studies failed to confirm the 
original findings.  DeGrandpre (1999) also points out other methodological problems:  
the participants were adults (rather than children, who constitute the majority of those 
with ADHD), there was connection made between the metabolism difference and the 
outward behaviors of the subjects, and the study did not take into account other factors 
that could have influenced metabolism differences, such as the smaller number of males 
in the control group. Nevertheless, as Diller (1998) notes, the belief that ADD is a 
neurological condition prevails not only among advocacy groups like CHADD but 
medical researchers and university faculty as well. 
Constructing Normalcy 
ADHD provides an important example of the way that education is operating to 
define “normalcy” in terms of how the body responds to the curriculum and the methods 
used to impart it.  This pathological stratification goes beyond Apple’s (1995) assertion 
that schools “maintain privilege in cultural ways by taking the form and content of the 
culture and knowledge of powerful groups and defining it as legitimate knowledge to be 
preserved and passed on . . .They teach norms, values, dispositions, and culture that 
contribute to the ideological hegemony of dominant groups (p. 38).  With the adoption of 
state-mandated curricula across the nation in the wake of No Child Left Behind, the 
progressive question of whose knowledge is of most worth is nearly moot, but the 
aggressive labeling that is taking place in schools today is not simply operating to 
privilege the “standards” as legitimate knowledge; it is constructing norms and values 
about the way we learn and about how our embodied knowledge fits (or does not fit) into 
the curriculum.  Although I expand on Apple’s (1995) understanding of the role of 
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schools in reproducing “legitimate” knowledge, his explanation of deviance still fits: 
“One might say here that deviance is “earned” by the deviant, since the overt and hidden 
curriculum, the social relations of the classroom, and the categories by which educators 
organize, evaluate, and give meaning to the activities found in schools are perceived as 
being basically neutral” (p. 37).  The active, spontaneous, and assertive ADHD body is 
differentiated from the passive, predictable, and receptive “neutral” body through a state 
of continual diagnosis.   
Julie Webber’s (2003) description of the way that government has responded to 
the deviant behavior of school violence is also indicative of the “official” response 
ADHD: “The question always asked when such tragedies occur is ‘What are the 
government, schools and lawmakers going to do about this problem?’ never ‘Why is this 
happening now, to whom, and in what setting?’” (p. 193).   In order to determine what to 
do about the problem of millions of disengaged students and how to fix their 
abnormalities, we look to individual bodies, which are much easily treated than a 
curriculum in which we are so deeply invested. This state of perpetual diagnosis is 
symptomatic of what Deleuze (1992) terms “control” societies, which differ from the 
Foucauldian disciplinary societies in which individuals are passed through a succession 
of institutions.  In the disciplinary society, what is important is the individuals “place” 
within the institutional framework, but in the control society the “password,” the means 
of accessing the individual’s “information,” becomes the focus. In this case, it is through 
the carefully documented (textualized) diagnosis that we gain access to information about 
how the student deviates from the “neutral” standard of normalcy.   
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A “biological” explanation for ADHD is convenient in many ways; parents can 
rid themselves of the guilt that perhaps they caused their child’s condition, and biological 
conditions can be treated inexpensively with medication.  Many physicians and ADHD 
advocates continue to hope that a definitive physiological and/or genetic “explanation” 
for ADHD will be discovered in order to legitimize its status as a neurobiological 
disability and justify the medical interventions that have become commonplace.  As we 
increase our “knowledge” of this condition, we perceive that we are gaining more 
information about the children with these characteristics by identifying their deficiencies, 
but instead we are isolating and exposing the minutia of their brains and genetic makeup 
because we need this explanation in order to “prove” that there is really a tangible and 
significant difference between people who exhibit the characteristics of ADHD and 
“normal” people. This search for a genetic explanation is not unlike the way we have 
attempted to define other forms of “deviance” in terms of eugenics: 
Eugenics saw the possible improvement of the race as being accomplished by 
diminishing problematic peoples and their problematic behaviors – these peoples 
were clearly delineated under the rubric of feeble-mindedness and degeneration as 
women, people of color, homosexuals, the working classes, and so on. (Davis, 
2002, p 14.) 
Just as our modern predecessors attempted to document what they saw as transgressive 
characteristics in order to “treat” them, medical research has sought to put to text a grand 
narrative to explain why so many children are now languishing in traditional classrooms 
across the nation.  These untamed, resistant bodies do not fit into the controlled and 
scripted environment that becomes necessary for the transmission of a standardized 
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curriculum.  Thus, even in the absence of significant physiological makeup of those 
diagnosed with ADHD, “experts” have depicted ADHD behavior as deviant and even 
delinquent.  Dr. David W. Goodman, an ADHD specialist at the John’s Hopkins 
University School of Medicine in Baltimore, asserts that “those with untreated ADHD 
take even more risks” warns, “A big problem is that someone with undiagnosed ADHD 
may prompt other kids to do something really dangerous” (Bernstein, 2006, p. 17).  Such 
fear-enciting tactics have been successful in mobilizing concerned parents to accept 
psychotropic medication as the primary treatment for their child’s academic failure. As 
one child psychiatrist notes “Parents and teachers are rushing like lemmings to identify a 
pathology. . . .Our current pathologizing of behavior leads to massive swelling of the 
ranks of the diseased, the dysfunctional, the disordered and the disabled” (Moreno, 1998, 
p. 1). 
Indeed, this seems to be the case, as with the emergence of ADHD has also come 
a dramatic new emphasis on subjectively diagnosed neurobiological disorders such as 
specific learning disabilities and autism.  Perhaps the most recognizable new condition is 
that of Asperger’s sydrome, which is considered to be a “high-functioning” form of 
Autism Spectrum disorder, which encompasses a wide range of largely unexplainable 
mental conditions.  The figures here are dramatic; according to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, the nation saw a 556 percent increase in the number of children 
with ASD being served in special education from 1991 to 1997. The CDC now estimates 
the incidence of Autism Spectrum disorders to be as high as 500, 000, affecting 0.024 to 
0.36 % of school-age children (2006).  
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Asperger’s didn’t officially join ADHD on the neurobiological scene until 1994, 
when it was recognized by the American Psychiatric Association as a form of autism, 
with distinct diagnostic criteria.  In 1981, however, British psychiatrist Dr. Lorna Wing 
published a paper that focused on the work of Hans Asperger, who had coined the term 
“Little Professor Syndrome” in 1944 to describe the behavior of some of his patients 
(Silberman, 2001).  Asperger had noticed that these young patients often possessed 
advanced verbal skills, tended to be extremely gifted in specific areas (especially math, 
science, and art) but lacked certain skills of social interactions.  In addition, children with 
Asperger’s syndrome, according to the DSM-IV, have excellent rote memory, and 
display intense curiosity about a specific area of interest (to the exclusion of other 
interests), but they have difficulty empathizing with others, and often react 
inappropriately in social situations.  Children with Asperger’s often have limited facial 
expressions and tone of voice, an inability to pick up on the non-verbal communications 
of others, and an intense attachment to certain objects and routines.  It was this 
combination of characteristics, along with what seems to be a distinct genetic tendency 
(which seems to be particularly pronounced among the techno-oriented families of 
Silicon Valley), to dub the condition “The Geek Syndrome.” 
As the veritable explosion of ADHD and Asperger’s illustrate, in recent years, the 
pathological categories we use to “define” the “others” in our classrooms have expanded 
rapidly to include many more characteristics and behaviors that are perceived to fall 
outside the “norm.”  Rhodes (1995) observes that, “ In the controversial ones, like 
“behavioral disorders” and “learning disabilities,” we have isolated all sorts of subtle 
differences, to the point where we could include most of the school population” (p. 460).  
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Thus, the state of perpetual diagnosis puts everyone “at-risk” for falling outside the norm 
and into a neurobiological disability.  However, when it comes to certain conditions, it 
seems that certain students are at greater risk than others: “a major portion of the 
individuals and groups we consider to have pathologies in learning also come from 
populations and cultures we have “othered” on the basis of color and socioeconomic 
status” (Rhodes, 1995, p. 460).  Thus, we see how the state of perpetual diagnosis, 
framed as a means of “assisting” learners with “special needs,” operates to construct 
cognitive privilege.   
As with ADHD, we have responded to Asperger’s with the same questions of 
what to do about the problem and the condition has been the subject of many concerns 
about the potential delinquency of those diagnosed. Like those diagnosed with ADHD, 
children with Asperger’s tend to be highly creative and inventive, and some skeptical 
depictions of Asperger’s have even bordered on anti-intellectual criticism.  Recently, in 
an article called “Nutty Professors,” which appeared in Chronicle of Higher Education, 
Mikita Brottman (2005) observed that, “Academe appeals particularly to introspective, 
narcissistic, obsessive characters who occasionally suffer from mood disorders or other 
psychological problems.  Often, these difficulties go untreated because they are closely 
tied to enhanced creativity (Brottman, 2005, p. B7.)  Here, Brottman not only asserts that 
we academics are just a bunch of nutcases; she further stigmatizes the energetic, 
assertive, spontaneous, and sometimes socially awkward traits shared by those diagnosed 
with both ADHD and Asperger’s. 
In the schools’ response to both neurobiological abnormalities, we see the process 
of textualization at work.  Just as Foucault (1978) explained the regulation of sex in 
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disciplinary society through studying and committing all its aspects to writing so that it 
could be properly controlled, we can see textualization operating to control the body. The 
sudden emergence of these new neurobiological phenomena have prompted us to study 
the brain extensively so that ostensibly all its aspects can be exposed and written into 
medical “knowledge” (Block’s “incarceration of visibility). And yet, the mapping of the 
brain has not rendered the answers we were looking for.  Ironically, Hallowell (1997) 
admits, that process has actually only left us with even more questions: 
Today we know more than ever about the brain – but in learning more we have 
realized how little we actually know.  With sophisticated brain scans that map the 
activity of networks of neurons we can peer inside the once impenetrable armor of 
our skulls and learn just how brains act when they are seeking, thinking, 
remembering, and even malfunctioning.  And yet the vast territory of the brain 
stretches out before us as uncharted, like the sixteenth-century maps of the New 
World we used to see in our fifth-grade history books.” (p. 42). 
Similarly, our attempts to “map” and textualize our genes in an attempt to uncover the 
“essential” (read “neutral”) genome has only further complicated our understanding of 
the complex interactions between human genes and the environment.  As Davis (2002) 
observes, we have discovered that “No one gene determines the course of a human life” 
(p. 17).  Brain science and genetic research has only further advanced a post-binary 
understanding of nature/culture. 
ADHD in Context 
 If our bodies are inseparable from the cultural contexts we find ourselves in, we 
must consider the potential implications of the postmodern environment many Americans 
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find ourselves in.  We live in a world of technological distractions: cell phones, fax 
machines, pagers, satellite channels, instant messages, high-speed web browsing, endless 
emails. Not to mention, we have fast cars, fast food, fast-pass credit cards, and fast 
vacations-to-go.  As U.S. News & World Report informs us, “Since 1965, the average 
news sound bite has shrunk from 42 seconds to just 8.  The average network TV ad has 
shrunk from 53 seconds to 25.  Fifteen-second ads are on the rise.  Multitasking is in.  
Downtime is out”  (3/26/01).  Everywhere we go we are bombarded with more 
information than we can possibly process, and our bodies, our brains, have to work 
overtime to in an attempt to keep up.  Restak (2003) explains that “the plasticity of our 
brains responds, for good or for bad, to the technology all around us: television, movies, 
cell phones, e-mail, laptop computers, and the Internet.  And by responding, I mean that 
our brain literally changes its organization and functioning to accommodate the 
abundance of stimulation forced on it by the modern world” (p. 38). 
 This “modern” world, as Restak (2003) calls it, is the digital age, the media-
saturated, information overloaded postmodern America.  In this predominantly visual 
context, we experience life in pictures: 
While driving to work in the morning we “fast-forward” a half-hour in our mind 
to the upcoming office meeting.  We reenact in our imagination a series of 
“scenarios” that could potentially take place.  A few minutes later, while entering 
the garage, we experience a “flashback” of the awkward “scene” that took place 
during last week’s meeting and “dub in” a more pleasing “take.” (Restak, 2003, p. 
50). 
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Here, the boundaries between where the images end and our bodies begin virtually 
disappear; we transcend time and space to inhabit multiple locations so that “place” seem 
insignficant.  We are perpetually immersed in image.  As I observed in describing 
postmodern culture’s contribution to the disembodied curriculum, we are often left 
feeling more distant from our material realities – flesh and blood lost in visual fiction – 
but we fail to perceive that distance because the image becomes the separation.   
An examination of the way the body operates within this digital-visual complex 
allows us to explore those more pertinent questions offered by Webber (2003): Why are 
these “neurobiological disorders” such as ADHD, happening now, to whom, and in what 
setting?  I think that Mark Hansen’s (2003) reinterpretation of Bergson's (1988) Matter 
and Memory, emphasizes both the profound impact of visual culture and the role that our 
bodies play in navigating the digital image.  Hansen establishes the body as a kind of 
central nexus: "the body functions as a kind of filter that selects, from among the universe 
of images circulating around it and according to its own embodied capacities, precisely 
those that are relevant to it" (3).  Perception is always embodied, as with the de-
differentiated media of the digital era, we see changes in the "body's scope of perceptual 
and affective possibilities" (22).  Hansen explains these possibilities through the concept 
of “affectivity”: “the capacity of the body to experience itself as “more than itself” and 
thus to deploy its sensorimotor power to create the unpredictable, the experimental, the 
new (p. 7).  Here, Hansen is primarily countering the notion that technological innovation 
leads to bodily transcendence and he makes an important statement about the 
indispensability of the human in the digital era.  However, Hansen’s description of how 
the body and the image operate seamlessly to create perception also reveals the 
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importance of understanding how our bodies are responding to our now profoundly 
visual, hyper-stimulated, hyper-connected culture. 
 It is important to note here that I am not attempting to pinpoint “postmodern 
visual media culture” as a culprit that has tainted the once obedient brains of our children.  
To define a distinct cause and effect relationship would be to juxtapose techno-culture 
and the body in binary terms.   Rather, I want to explore this relationship to explore how 
a non-dichotomous understanding of the body might lead us to reconsider our “response” 
to variations in cognitive style and social interaction.  I return to Sullivan’s (2001) 
definition of the “transactional” body:  
the relationship between organism and environment is dynamic and ongoing, both 
organism and environment are continually being remade by means of shifts and 
changes in the other.  Thus “transaction” designates a process of mutual 
constitution that entails mutual transformation, including the possibility of 
significant change (p. 1).  
If we begin to think of our bodies as engaged in a process of mutual reorganization with 
our environments, we can begin to see rigid our ideas about teaching and learning have 
remained in comparison. 
 Hansen’s (2003) emphasis on imagery is key to understanding the predominantly 
visual context of a digital environment.  If we take seriously Hansen’s notion of the body 
as the transactional, medial nexus of perception that, like the digital image, is continually 
being remade, reorganized, and revised, we can understand the importance of mutual 
constitution.  In the digital era, we can no longer imagine that technology exists as a 
distinct entity independent of the body. Technology has provided us with the ability to 
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exist in multiple identities and presences simultaneously.  As Restak (2003) explains, 
“The demarcation between here and elsewhere has become blurred.  Thanks to 
technology, each of us exists simultaneously in not just one here but in several” (p. 52).  
We rely on image to navigate those multiple presences between where our flesh and 
blood happens to be physically situated and the multiple “locations” we find ourselves in. 
Restak (2003 expands on this thought, explaining that, “intellectually, we have always 
known that the “reality” of the here and now before our eyes is only one among many.  
But we never directly experienced this multilevel reality until technology made it 
possible to reach from one end of the world to another and wipe out differences in time, 
space, and place” (p. 53). 
The particular characteristics used to define ADHD:  the constant cognitive 
“scene” shifting, the state of hyperawareness of the image, illustrate the way that this 
process of mutual transformation has operated to change the way that many students are 
responding to methods of schooling that no longer make sense for who they are. The 
reliance of those diagnosed with ADHD on image-based perception has been 
corroborated in scientific study:  A 2000 study (Schweitzer et al., 2000) had adults with 
and without ADHD listen to a series of numbers, add each number to the previous 
number.  Those with ADD said they visualized images rather than simply listening to the 
spoken numbers, which was also confirmed using brain-imaging technology.  In the 
ADHD adults, the so-deemed visual processing regions of the brain were activated, 
whereas the non-ADHD adults tended to rely on auditory processing to interpret the 
information that was given to them.  In the image-rich, media-drenched cultural 
environment, we must attempt to adapt to the constant barrage of digital information 
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through multiple, simultaneous acts of cognition – we receive information all at once and 
often spontaneously from countless sources and we rely on our bodies (Hansen’s medial 
nexus) to, returning to Hansen’s (2003) words, “deploy its sensorimotor power to create 
the unpredictable, the experimental, the new” (p. 7).  Considering the modern work 
environment described by Restak (2003), one could easily argue that a person has to 
possess at least some ADHD traits just to survive in the adult techno-culture: 
You must learn to rapidly process information, function amidst a surrounding 
your parents would have described as “chaotic,” always remain prepared to 
rapidly shift from one activity to another, and redirect your attention among 
competing tasks without becoming bogged down or losing time.  Such facility in 
rapid information processing requires profound alternations in our brain (p. 48).   
Compare this corpo/reality of the digital context to the classroom setting where, even 
when multiple modes of presentation are employed, children are generally offered one 
information source to which they are to impart their undivided attention.  This traditional 
top-down method (Freire’s (197?) banking method still at work) is a one-to-all approach 
in which information originating in the standards is passed down from one teacher (or 
textbook) to all students. As Freed and Parsons (1997) observe, “Our educational system 
hammers at visual learners’ weaknesses rather than utilizing their greatest strength: an 
uncanny visual memory.  The cost of such rigidity is incalculable, and the lost potential is 
astronomical” (p. 18).    When teachers today complain that they can’t “compete” with 
video games, they are expressing the frustration that comes from the presence of 
technology that surpasses the limitations of human physicality.  And yet, rather than 
trying to really understand the process that is taking place here, what we do about this 
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“problem,” is rigidly cling to the restrictive one-to-all approach and rely on medication to 
regulate the unruly bodies.  In the same way that our society turns difference (immobility, 
for example) into disability by failing to make an environment navigable for someone 
confined to a wheelchair, we make the cognitive and physical traits of ADHD a disability 
by failing to make the curriculum navigable.  However, because we assume that the 
curriculum is “neutral,” we treat the child instead of the environment. Of course, 
medication has not been the only way we have tried to control the symptoms of ADHD, 
but alternative treatments for ADHD have offered little hope.  Thousands of parents, 
desperate to keep their children off medication being pushed on them by commercial 
medicine, have tried modified diets, exercise plans, herbal remedies, and biofeedback 
training, among other non-pharmacological treatments, but it seems that only 
psychotropic drugs consistently force their bodies into the conformity that the 
standardized curriculum requires.  
Psychotropic Ethics 
 The issue here, where medication is concerned, is not that all psychotropic drugs 
are evil or that altering the body to make it “fit” into an environment is always wrong.  
We all want to be well, to be free from pain, free to live and move as we choose.  But 
there is nothing liberating about using stimulant drugs to preserve a culture of schooling 
that is grounded in inequality and hegemony.  Part of the incalculable cost of the rigidity 
of our educational system is realized in the perpetuation of disembodied educational 
practice and the preservation of an outdated notion of an ideal, “neutral” student body.   
By “treating” the symptoms of conditions like ADHD and Asperger’s so that students can 
conform to the demands of a maladaptive (morose) curriculum, we fail to recognize the 
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what Jane Healy (2004) calls the “magic of human variability.” The human body is not 
standard, static, consistent. As the opening Aldous Huxley quote illustrates, the only 
consistent people are dead.  However, our obsession with constantly diagnosing the 
cognitive styles and classroom behaviors of our students suggests that we still believe in 
some essential model, the “model” student body.  If we are determining some students 
are “deficient” because we find them to be active, energetic, hyperaware of sensory data, 
and existing in states of multi-presence, then the ideal student must be one who is 
passive, half-hearted, unaware of all of but the authoritative teacher, and existing only in 
the here and now.  Certainly, such a student body makes for a convenient vessel, but is 
this a realistic ideal for the digital age?  As Hartmann (1996) explains, “our system was 
designed from the ground up to operate exactly as it does today.  Once upon a time the 
most important product of a public school system, for government and commerce, was 
compliant young women for the household and men for the arm and industry.  Do we still 
want this today?” (p. 21).   
 Hartmann’s question is pivotal: do we still want this?  Is this normative apparatus, 
the standardized curriculum, designed to contain the excesses of the body, worth the price 
that millions of American children are paying?   As David Nylund (2000) observes, “To 
place a child on Ritalin so that he can succeed in this environment ignores the wider 
problem: the structure, tools, methods, and resources of our schools” (p. 186). Why must 
we diagnose and treat the body without consideration for the context?  What is the 
advantage of the pathologizing of difference?  Eberstadt (1999) has an answer: 
One of the most obvious reasons “millions of Americans, most of them children, 
are now taking Ritalin can be summarized in a single word that crops up 
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everywhere in the dry-bones literature on add and its drug of choice: compliance.  
One day at a time, the drug continues to make children do what their parents and 
teachers either will not or cannot get them to do without it: Sit down, shut up, 
keep still, pay attention” (p. 24). 
Perhaps we are getting what we want, if what we want to keep the messy, frenzied 
intricacies of bodies out of our classrooms – out of sight, out of mind. But what are we 
really getting?  As Breggin (1998), observes, “Ritalin calms children, indeed it often 
turns rambunctious kids into socially inhibited conformers, which, though it may make 
things easier for teachers and parents, is but suppressing the growing-up problems, not 
solving them” (p. 99).  It seems to me that just when we need more than ever to really 
consider our corpo/realities, our embodied perceptions, we find ways to push needs and 
desires further into the margins of curriculum.  The medicated compliance of unruly 
bodies comes at a high price:    
If we think of our ourselves as little more than chemical machines that can be 
altered by drugs, then what happens to traditional concepts like free will and 
personal responsibility?  While for the most part advances in our understanding of 
the brain lead to enhancement of, rather than limitations on, our freedom, what 
will be the overall result if the benefits come at the price of biobabble: people 
interpreting their experience in chemical terms rather than interpersonal ones 
(Restak, 2003, p. 147)? 
Instead of considering moving out of our pedagogical comfort zones, instead of engaging 
our students’ minds and bodies in confronting difference through dialogue and 
experience, we allow medication to become yet another boundary, a safety net to protect 
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us from the body in chaos. Not only do we teach children that difference is unacceptable, 
and that the possess deficits beyond their control, but we diminish the possibility that we 
can reclaim the distance we had already created between ourselves and the bodies we 
teach, between teachers and children. 
Each day, parents across the country are struggling with the decision to medicate 
their children with powerful stimulants to standardize them, to diminish the intricate 
variations that have emerged from the mutual transformation of the body/techno-culture 
complex. I am writing for these parents, and I am writing for the children who grow up 
believing that they lacking, deviant, sick.  I am also writing for my own children, because 
although my bright, imaginative daughter has thus far lived up to the “ideal,” I live in fear 
that one of my sons might eventually become yet another casualty of perpetual diagnosis.  
From the time my oldest son turned two, I have monitored his behavior with baited 
breath, becoming more apprehensive with every year.  Because he has a late birthday, 
ADHD played a big part in our decision not to send him to state-funded Pre-K until he 
was almost five.  Now almost six, he is a conscientious student but he is an active child 
and a visual learner like me.  As he gets ready to enter kindergarten next year, I worry, 
what if he is too restless?  What if he doesn’t listen?  What will I do if I have to face the 
guilt and shame that millions of American parents have confronted in the last decade?  
For now, I can only hope that his body will be able to navigate between the structured, 
standardized classroom and the fast-paced, stimulating and spontaneous world he knows. 
The question that remains for all of us is how many millions of cognitively 
“disabled” children will it take for us to understand that the deficit lies not in our 
constantly shifting corpo/realities but in the educational system that has failed to respond 
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to our changing technological and cultural landscapes? Eberhardt’s (1999) sarcasm 
illustrates the absurdity of the dilemma we find ourselves in: “Surely this country can do 
more, much more, to reduce fidgeting, squirming, talking excessively, interrupting, losing 
things, ignoring adults, and all those other pathologies of what used to be called 
childhood (p. 24).  Where do we draw the line?  How many millions of children must we 
medicate before we decide that maybe the “easy” solution wasn’t really a solution at all?  
Certainly, the current obsession with high-stakes standardized testing has only 
exacerbated the disembodiment of school curriculum and educational practice.  Maybe 
standardized testing is never going to go away.  Perhaps, then, our responsibility is even 
more urgent because we have to find a way to address the needs of transactional bodies in 
meaningful ways in spite of assessments that force us to maintain a safe distance.  We 
cannot allow the living, breathing, social, emotional, chaotic, complex, unique, and 
wonderful bodies of our children to be overshadowed by accountability.  If we have any 
hope of preserving democratic public education in this country, we have to find a way to 
embrace the “magic of human variability,” spontaneity, difference.  Our bodies give us a 
place to start. 
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CHAPTER 5 
BODIES IN THE CLASSROOM: 
REFLEXIVE PEDAGOGY AND AN EMBODIED CURRICULUM 
 
What does the future hold for our teaching bodies and the taught bodies of 
children who enter our classrooms each day? Can we allow difference, bliss, and pain to 
inform our pedagogies? Can we liberate capricious, extraordinary bodies, isolated and 
othered through theory, pedagogy, popular culture, and pathology, from the margins of a 
standardized curriculum?   
In the era of high-stakes testing and accountability, these questions seem more 
important now more than ever.   In keeping with a long history of behaviorism and the 
idea that the “most anxiety produces the best results,” we have placed an enormous 
amount of pressure on teachers to shape their students into the standardized ideal – or 
else.  In light of such extreme pressures, as Kohn (2005) observes, we see that “[p]ractice 
tests replace student-centered projects; students appear alternately anxious and bored; 
terrific teachers quit in disgust (p. 20).  What’s more, teachers, many of whom understand 
the inability of standardized tests to accurately “measure” their students, resort to 
medication to deal with the anxiety of accountability, and students are placed on 
medication to control characteristics that are not conducive to shallow, desubstantialized 
learning.  And perhaps, worst of all, students and teachers come to understand that their 
only value lies in the text, the scores they produce, and that their bodies, their physical, 
social, emotional experiences are not important.  As Kohn (2005) explains,  “when some 
capabilities are privileged over others, and a broader approach to education is sacrificed, 
we begin to look at students differently.  We lose sight of children “except as they 
distribute themselves across deciles (Hogan, 1974, p. 111)” (p. 20).  To lose sight of 
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children beyond the rhetoric of standards and accountability is to ignore their 
corpo/realities, their embodied knowledge and experiences, the lenses of their perception.   
Making Bodies Matter 
In the regimented system of top-down scripts and standardized objectives, we 
have constructed boundaries between “academic” learning and all the other types of 
knowledge we need to experience the world within and beyond the classroom doors.  As 
Reynolds (2003) observes, “Our entire economic and educational system is based on 
profit, efficiency and control rather than on human need, justice and compassion” (p. 42).  
We have operated under a widespread belief  “that schools are best organized to 
accomplish academic goals and that we should charge other institutions with the task of 
pursuing the physical, moral, social, emotional, spiritual, and aesthetic aims that we 
associate with the whole child (Noddings, 2005, p. 10).  We have pushed aside these 
other aspects of our students’ being in an effort to perpetually textualize and diagnose 
them so that we can fill their deficits before test time comes.  This separation, this 
alienating codification, does not resonate with our complexity of our most intimate 
context, our bodies.  If we want to make public education matter, if we want it to be 
meaningful, and liberating, and worthwhile, we have to complicate our understanding of 
what teaching and learning really mean.  As Eisner (2005) observes, 
In the human organism, there is no such thing as an independent part; all parts are 
interconnected.  We need to recognize those connections when we teach, when we 
design education environments, when we provide incentives, and when we grade 
students.  Attention to such complex matters will not simplify our tasks as 
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teachers, but it will bring education closer to the heart of what really matters” (p. 
18). 
We do need to recognize those connections, but we need to do more than that; we need to 
broaden our understandings of achievement and assessment and bring the body, with all 
its frenzied, impulsive intricacies, fully into the curricular conversation.  
 We can begin by rethinking the body in theory.   We need to resist the temptation 
to employ postmodernism in writing the physical body out of discursive subjectivity.  We 
can appreciate the fleeting quality of our culturally constructed identities without losing 
sight of bodies that bleed and break.  We have to recognize not only the way that we 
discursively construct our bodies but how our bodies participate in language games 
through initiation and response, sometimes without our permission.  To do so requires 
that we “get over” our biological insecurities, our fears of confronting the frailty of 
human flesh.  As LeCourt (2004) asserts, we have to recognize the role our bodies play in 
our knowing of ourselves and others:  
My body is how I perceive myself.  I have lived in this body for years; it is this 
body with whom others interact, and through this body that I construct the social 
relations that sustain me in the material world.  There is a substance to body, my 
students continually remind me, that is not perceived as fluid or discursive.  
Rather, we live within social relations with others that are perceived as bodily 
interactions (p. 21). 
Just as Hansen (2004) recognizes the body as the medial nexus for the image, LeCourt 
sees the body as the site from which our social relations are constructed.  Thus, we bring 
the body into theory by considering how our understandings of identity, our perceptions 
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of ourselves and others, are intimately and simultaneously connected to our bodies and 
our social/cultural/technological relations. 
Lennard Davis (2002) suggests that we can reimagine the body in theory by 
expanding our thinking from postmodernism to what he calls “dismodernism,” a 
rethinking of our understanding of postmodern identity through disability.  Davis (2002) 
suggests that disability is unique in that it is historically linked to the categories of 
oppression most visible in academic discourse: race, gender and sexuality (p. 26).  I have 
already noted Davis implication the eugenics movement in “diminishing problematic 
peoples and their problematic behaviors – these peoples were clearly delineated under the 
rubric of feeble-mindedness and degeneration as women, people of color, homosexuals, 
the working classes, and so on” (p. 14).  These transgressive bodies were faultily but 
powerfully constructed through pathological categories of disability.  The “flawed” 
science used to initially construct these identities is not unlike the questionable methods 
used to define the newest postmodern additions to the category of disability, 
“neurobiological” disorders like ADHD. Thus, by studying the ways that disability has 
been constructed, we can explore “how all groups, based on physical traits or markings, 
are selected for disablement by a larger system of regulation and signification” (Davis, 
2002, p. 29). Davis argues that, considering the initial construction of race, gender, and 
sexuality as well as the vast assortment of “conditions” (blindness, amputation, obesity, 
disfigurement, diabetes, attention deficit disorder, Asperger’s, learning disability, and so 
on) that are included under the category, disability presents us with a “malleable view of 
the human body and identity” (26).  Thus, Davis’ notion of “dismodernism” helps us 
understand how power has operated to construct the inequality of particular bodies, and 
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the importance of the recognition that human bodies cannot and should not be 
standardized: 
The dismodern era ushers in the concept that difference is what all of us have in 
common.  That identity is not fixed but malleable.  That technology is not 
separate but part of the body.  That dependence, not individual interdependence, 
is the rule. There is no single clockmaker who made the uniform clock of the 
human body. The watchword of dismodernism could be: Form follows 
dysfunction.” (p. 27).   
The notion of dismodernism helps to bring the body into discourse in a way that 
recognizes the “magic of human variability,” the unity in difference, and the fiction of 
“normalcy.”  Davis’s expansion of the postmodern subject allows us to bring the body 
into discourse in a meaningful way while maintaining our understanding of the physical 
body as inseparable from its discursive social, cultural, and educational contexts.   
 Whether or not we can accept Davis’ abandonment of normalcy, we can imagine 
a body that is at once subject and object, discursive and substantive.  As Grumet (2005) 
explains, “My body is not only material and the object of another’s gaze, it is also my 
contact with the world, and through it runs a stream of responses and meanings that 
escapes the channels that culture has constructed to contain it (Grumet, 2003, p. 250).  
Grumet (2003) looks to Merleau-Ponty (1964) to clarify the third space of subjectivity 
that is both “of the body” and “of the world.”  Merleau-Ponty finds that his subjectivity 
“is inseparable from this body and this world.  The ontological world and body which we 
find at the core of the subject are not the world or body as idea, but on the one hand the 
world itself contracted into a comprehensive grasp, and on the other hand the body itself 
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as a knowing-body” (p. 408). Such an admission of the body as knowing-body and 
discursive body allows us to deconstruct the body without denying its existence.   
Recognizing the fiction of normalcy and the role our bodies play as the nexus of 
our social/cultural/technological interactions can also help us resituate the body within 
the curriculum.  The bodies of teachers and students are knowing-bodies existing both in 
the classroom and in the world.  Acknowledging our bodies, resituating the body as the 
nexus of perception, is both liberating and limiting, as Grumet (2003) explains: 
My body throws a horizon around my imagination.  It does not reduce my 
subjectivity to my arthritic knee; it does not erase my mortality because my hair is 
still brown.  But it tethers my imagination to a set of possibilities, which, although 
it is protean, is not limitless.  This aesthetic reveals the reciprocity of subjectivity 
and objectivity by recognizing that the object of study, whether it is literature, 
sociology, field biology, or composition, is constituted by an inquiring 
subjectivity:  We see what we look for, and what we look for is constituted not 
only by what my body can do, but also what it cannot do (p. 255). 
These inquiring bodies are our nexus for knowing the world and interacting with others; 
we cannot act on the teacher or the student without also acting on the body because the 
body is always already inscribed in language, written into the curriculum in more or less 
damaging ways.  The disembodied curriculum, then, is one that fails to “see” the body, 
one that writes the body into the margins in order to accomplish its educational goals. 
Embodying Pedagogy and Curriculum  
An embodied curriculum, then, is one that “sees” the body, one that brings the 
body fully into the learning process to act as the vinculum drawn over 
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social/cultural/technological interactions within and beyond the classroom.  An embodied 
curriculum draws us into intimacy with the sensual, unruly, unpredictable, desirous body; 
it is a curriculum that recognizes the connections “between materiality and the psychic 
world, between social and cultural conditions and circumstances, between desires and 
pleasures, as well as disappointments,” and “undermines ‘orderly’ teacher-student 
relations” (Levy, 2000, p. 83).  I like the term “reflexive” because it has both 
physiological and theoretical meanings: it refers both to an action performed without 
conscious thought and the method or theory that takes account of presence of the 
researcher/author on what is being investigated.  Reflexive pedagogy, then, refers back to 
the embodied subject and the larger contexts from which it is inseparable.  Rather than 
forcing the body to fit into the curriculum in discrete bits and pieces (30 minutes of 
physical education here, a week of sex education there), the reflexive curriculum always 
already recognizes the body, so that references to embodied knowing become an organic 
part of the learning process.   The reflexive curriculum, like the 
culturally/socially/technologically embedded body, is connected, responsive, meaningful, 
personal, multiplex.   
Certainly, this approach to teaching and learning sounds inviting, but how do we 
realize embodied, reflexive practice when we are mandated to deliver rigid, standardized 
content and produce evidence of learning that is limited to answering multiple-choice 
questions?  As Eisner (2005) notes, “One consequence of our preoccupation with 
standards is that it freezes our conception of what we want to accomplish in our schools.  
Rigor gets defined and becomes associated with rigor mortis.” (p. 15).  Is it too late to 
revive public education and recover curriculum from the rigor morgue?  Obviously, I 
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would not be writing about reflexive pedagogy if I didn’t think it was a real possibility, in 
spite of the constraints of state-dictated standards.  As a person whose very livelihood 
stems from school improvement (read increased test scores) efforts, I want to be realistic 
about what I am proposing here.  While it seems logical that a truly reflexive curriculum 
would emerge from the needs and interests of the learners rather than the mandates of 
official knowledge, I do not believe that prescriptive standards erase all possibility of 
reflexivity and embodied learning.  Rather, by changing the way we think about teaching 
bodies, we can begin to recognize the connections, meanings, and multiplicities that even 
the youngest knowing-bodies always already bring to the classroom.  Our job as 
educators is to accept and embrace those aspects in our students and our selves. 
In honoring the variability of bodies and contexts, I would not venture to offer a 
prescriptive framework for establishing a reflexive curriculum.  We could imagine as 
many different ways to embody, personalize, complicate, re-member and re-vise 
curricula as there are classrooms.  However, I want to discuss some of the reflexive 
practices that can help inform embodied learning.  These practices, which I have chosen 
to discuss because they most resonate most with my understanding of embodied 
pedagogy, are not conceptually distinct; they bleed into and from one another, and they 
could be expressed in many different ways depending on the particular context in which 
they emerge.  
Disclosure 
When I introduced my body autobiography in the first chapter, I brought up 
Donna Lecourt’s (2004) observation that “theory does not begin in the academy; it begins 
in everyday interactions and reactions.  It begins in autobiography” (p. 1).  To write 
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reflexively about the body, I had to unearth and unbury my “private” understandings (or 
perhaps, misunderstandings) about my body.  I believe that this process of disclosure is 
important to reflexive pedagogy because it is a way of purposefully bringing our bodies, 
our inquiring subjectivities, into the classroom.  As I began to examine the body through 
the perceptual lens of disability, I came across a dialogue between three scholars with 
disabilities who, each new term, anticipated the moment when they would “disclose” 
their disabilities to their university students.  I wondered, if we all walk into the 
classrooms with different needs, desires, identities, and varying abilities and disabilities, 
why don’t we feel the need to offer a similar “confession”?  If we think of our bodies in 
Davis’s (2003) “dismodern” terms, and we accept that “form follows dysfunction,” then 
we can see how disclosure can undermine the isolating and alienating fiction of normalcy 
and bring us into a more intimate relationship with ourselves and others.   
However, because we are accustomed to relegating our corpo/realities to the 
margins of educational environments, such disclosure does not come naturally. 
Brueggemann and Moddelmog (2003), who term this “coming out pedagogy,” observe, 
“This act of naming our invisible and supposedly private identities can seem to turn the 
classroom away from knowledge and toward intimacy, and this can be troubling for both 
our students and ourselves because we have been conditioned to see the classroom as 
only an intellectual space” (p. 213). Yet, this process of “coming out,” of confessing our 
particular embodied subjectivities, serves to deconstruct the boundaries we have created 
to confine the body in the traditional school curriculum.  The process becomes even more 
meaningful when it becomes a continual process rather than a single moment:  “Within 
this perspective, our coming out is not so much a functional disclosure as it is an 
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embodied performance” (Brueggemann and Moddelmog, 2003, p. 213).   This embodied 
performance allows teachers and students to resituate identity within an understanding of 
both oppressive and enabling relationships.  In this way, the ongoing dialogue of 
disclosure becomes “a bidirectional process of communication in which we and our 
students must do more than simply encounter a “secret”: We and they must relate to it.  
That relationship is sometimes comforting, sometimes discomforting, and sometimes 
both at once” (Brueggemann and Moddelmog, 2003, p. 213.). 
Lability 
The process of disclosure is perpetuated through another element of reflexive 
practice: lability, an openness to change and spontaneity.  I choose to use this term 
because its meanings are rooted in the body: In biochemistry, labile means easily 
repositioned, as, for example, a labile nitric oxide molecule.   In a psychiatric context, 
labile refers to emotional instability, freely expressed and easily aroused emotions and 
uncontrolled moods.  I take great pleasure in taking this term, often used by medical 
professionals to describe the mood swings experienced by menstruating, pregnant, and 
menopausal women, as presenting it is a positive trait of reflexive pedagogy.  Freedom of 
emotional expression, instability and spontaneity are all vital elements of our being open 
to the new ways of teaching and learning that emerge from our deepened explorations of 
our subjectivities. Once we have begun to participate in the process of disclosure, our 
particular needs and desires can inform and shape the curriculum so that we avoid 
privileging certain bodies and ways of knowing.  However, the traditional structures of 
that guide school improvement – schedules, grading and promotion policies, assessments, 
and outwardly imposed expert “interventions” – are not often conducive to a responsive, 
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collaborative curriculum and generally operate under paradigms of efficiency and 
control.  As Eisner (2005) asserts, “for U.S. schools, the speed of reaching the destination 
is considered a virtue: The brighter students are the faster students” (p. 17).  Education, 
then, becomes not something to evoke pleasure and fulfillment (like a satisfying meal) 
but another rebarbative chore that must be must be accomplished in order to move on to 
more important things (like waste management).  Consider the traditional model of 
curriculum proposed by Bobbit (1918) nearly a century ago in The Curriculum:  “These 
will show the abilities, attitudes, habits, appreciations and forms of knowledge that men 
need.  These will be the objectives of the curriculum.  They will be numerous, definite 
and particularized.  The curriculum will then be that series of experiences which children 
and youth must have by way of obtaining those objectives” (42).  This canonical view of 
curriculum, from which Tyler’s (1949) authoritative Basic Principles of Curriculum and 
Instruction emerged, could very well describe the state-mandated models now in use, 
which leave little room for flexible, sensitive instruction that addresses the needs and 
desires of particular bodies. 
Moreover, school administrators, educators, and parents internalize these 
paradigms, finding it hard to imagine “improvement” outside of these frameworks.  In 
this context, continual flexibility, changing to meet the needs of particular bodies in 
particular situations, becomes problematic. The dilemma we must face is whether we can 
be open to reflexive educational environments embodying “soft” values that, as Eisner 
(2005) observes, “substantially differ from the dominant cultural view?” (p. 16).  If we 
have so concretized a narrow concept of academic performance as the “key to social and 
economic mobility,” can we convince communities of learners to “risk” this established 
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measure of achievement in order to “enliven school life” in ways that may be perceived 
as “nonacademic” (Eisner, 2005, p. 16)? 
Dialogue 
In order to create spaces for disclosure and flexibility, and thus, risk, we have to 
reevaluate our embedded perceptions of teaching and learning through critical dialogue.  
If we accept the body as inscribed in language, then embodied pedagogy must involve 
engaging in meaningful, personal discourse.  As Reynolds (2003) suggests, “A 
curriculum should allow both teacher and student to develop a critical, caring, 
compassionate conversation rather than treat human beings as objects to be manipulated 
by prescribed and pre-fashioned technical rationales that reduce human beings to mere 
raw material” (p. 43).  Peter Trifonas (2005) explains that discourse is important because 
it is the “medium through which students can practice the critical power to interrogate 
concepts for the sake of learning more about the self while keeping in mind the 
exploitation or alienation that may arise when knowledge claims are taken to be absolute 
and not interpretations to be enriched by the creative adding of the difference of 
experience to a rational possibility” (p. 159).  Dialogue creates passages from which to 
negotiate the complexities of embodied subjectivity, and asks teachers and students to 
reconsider knowledge claims through an understanding of difference.  Dialogue, then, 
gives way to critical pedagogy, which “allows, indeed encourages, students and teachers 
together to confront the real problems of their existence and relationships... When 
students confront the real problems of their existence they will soon also be faced with 
their own oppression (Grundy, 1987, p. 105).  Critical dialogue opens up the curriculum 
to possibility, contradiction, and difference.  Students can then begin to interrogate the 
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ways that regulation and signification operate to “castigate difference in the everyday 
conditions that house the living realm of our aspirations as students and teachers” 
(Trifonas, 2005, p. 159). 
 Like disclosure, dialogue does not necessarily emerge easily when both teachers 
and students are accustomed to a passive, top-down, standardized curriculum.  Engaging 
in critical dialogue calls our identities and beliefs into question, which Delpit (1988) says 
“is not easy. It is painful as well, because it means turning yourself inside out, giving up 
your sense of who your are, and being willing to see yourself in the unflattering light of 
another’s angry gaze.  It is not easy, but it is the only way to learn what it might feel like 
to be someone else and the only way to start the dialogue” (p. 297).  By starting the 
dialogue, we engage our bodies in the learning process and the active, collaborative 
transformation of our inquiring subjectivities.   
Co-operation 
 By continually disclosing and building connections through our discursive 
“secrets,” and engaging in critical dialogue, teachers and students can work together, 
operating jointly to construct a classroom curriculum that is meaningful and personal – 
embodied.  Kohn (2005) calls this collaborative model a working with approach rather 
than a doing to strategy.  Rather than imposing the mandated curriculum on students 
through a set of prescribed practices laid out neatly by a textbook, the standards become a 
part of our disclosure as teachers: we expose them to the students and engage them in 
constructing learning experiences that can reach the needs and desires they have 
disclosed to us.  All of the constraints and mandates that are imposed on us – 
performance standards, pacing guides, textbooks, assessments – as well as our own needs 
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and desires as experienced educators, are brought into the dialogue so that these limits 
can become part of the critical conversation.  In the same way that we name our 
subjective identities through disclosure, we name the mandates, exposing them and 
making them transparent so that they become a part of the ongoing dialogue about how 
and why and what we learn.  Like the co-evolving body/culture/technology complex, we 
work through our rhizomatic connections to “co-operate” in constructing the curriculum, 
enacting new social relations and laying bare the power relations that create inequality 
along the way. Through consistent and ongoing dialogue, the curriculum (even a 
standardized one) can be revisited, reimagined, and reconstructed to meet the meet the 
needs of our knowing-bodies.  
Discomfort 
 The process of continual disclosure and dialogue opens up the curriculum to a 
level of intimacy and interdependence that can be disconcerting, which leads us to the 
reflexive condition of discomfort.  Embodied pedagogy requires us to constantly move 
out of our comfort zones to unearth the private and the passionate, which have long been 
silenced by the traditional school curriculum.  Yet, it is through such discomfort that we 
can confront the contradictions of our corpo/realities, interrogate normalcy and disability, 
and accept and embrace difference in order to construct a reflexive curriculum. This 
discomfiting dialogue is a transformative space from which we can explore our own 
subjectivities and call into question the dominant values that typically frame teaching and 
learning, which Boler and Zembylas (2003) describe as “pedagogy of discomfort.”  
Through this process, students and teachers work together to recognize and problematize 
“the deeply embedded emotional dimensions that frame and shape daily habits, routines, 
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and unconscious complicity with hegemony (Boler and Zembylas, 111).   Pedagogy of 
discomfort purposefully attends to affective perception and embodied knowing in order 
to expose the ways we perform and hypostatize prevailing norms and assumptions 
traditional educational habits and routines.  As Boler and Zembylas (2003), explain, “By 
closely examining emotional reactions and responses – what we call emotional stances – 
one begins to identify unconscious privileges as well as invisible ways in which one 
complies with dominant ideology (p. 111). 
As Brueggemann and Moddelmog (2003) describe, “this approach to coming out 
makes our classrooms places of comfort and discomfort because it encourages our 
students and us to share our stories, to investigate our identities, and to name our 
passions” (p. 216).  Teachers and students must initiate this process of “fleshing out” of 
our stories, identities and passions because it does not emerge effortlessly from an 
educational culture of standardization and sterility.  This initiation can be difficult, as 
Martha Stoddard Holmes (2003) describes of her own experience of exposing bodies in 
the classroom: 
The classroom bodies were all under scrutiny, even when the class talked about 
bodies, disabilities, or differences as concepts.  Many discussions were 
unintentionally painful in their association with the bodies the discussants lived in 
outside of the classroom, bodies that were stared at, rejected, obstructed from 
access to bathrooms and classrooms, diagnosed and classified, loved for the 
wrong reasons, photographed, written about, beaten, as well as treated kindly, 
loved, soothed and delighted (Freedman and Holmes, 2003, p. 5). 
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While self-exposure can unearth powerful emotions in a classroom of adults, such a 
process may emerge with less difficulty for children who have not yet experienced a 
lifetime of affective repression.  We can begin this dialogue even with very young 
children (and we do this in preschool) by helping them name their thoughts, feelings, 
emotions, and experiences, but this process needs to continue into adulthood.  Perhaps, if 
we engage children in this dialogue of disclosure as they grow, we can help them resist 
the oppression and hegemony that has left so many of us feeling lost and distant. 
 Ng (2003) describes a similar reflexive process that she calls “teaching against the 
grain,” a term she borrows from Marilyn Cochran-Smith (1991), in which we invite our 
students in examining the ways that power relations based on race, gender, class, and/or 
ability intersect to marginalize particular bodies.  Ng suggests that we must move beyond 
our well-meaning but misguided assumption that we should “treat everyone the same” in 
an effort to avoid bias and inequality because in doing so we actually conceal the unequal 
power relations that lead to marginalization.  Similarly, as Ng (2003) explains, 
“educational policies that assume that people are the same of equal may serve to entrench 
existing inequality precisely because people enter into the educational process with 
different and unequal experiences” (p. 214).  Teaching against the grain bids us to 
disclose and interrogate those different and unequal experiences in order to disclose the 
power dynamics that construct the inequalities of particular bodies. As Ng (2003) 
observes, “Rather than overlooking the embeddedness of gender, race, class, ability, and 
other forms of inequality that shape our interactions, working against the grain makes 
explicit the political nature of education and how power operates to privilege, silence, 
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and marginalize individuals who are differently located in the educational process (p. 
214). 
 What does this process of disclosure, dialogue, and discomfort look like in the 
classroom?  Ng (2003) submits the description offered by Cochran-Smith (1991), who is 
worth quoting at length here:  
To teach against the grain, teachers have to understand and work both within and 
around the culture of teaching and the politics of schooling at their particular 
schools and within their larger school system and communities . . .Without 
condescension or defensiveness, they have to work with parents and other 
teachers on different ways of seeing and measuring development, connecting and 
dividing knowledge, and knowing about teaching and schooling.  They have to be 
astute observers of individual learners with the ability to pose and explore 
questions that transcend cultural attribution, institutional habit, and the alleged 
certainty of outside experts.  They have to see beyond and through the 
conventional labels and practices that sustain the status quo by raising 
unanswerable and often uncomfortable questions.  Perhaps most importantly, 
teachers who work against the grain must name and wrestle with their own 
doubts, must fend off the fatigue of reform and depend on the strength of their 
individual and collaborative convictions that their work ultimately makes a 
difference in the fabric of social responsibility (p. 284-85).  
Such an engagement in critical, reflexive practice asks teachers to radically reevaluate 
their traditional roles as technicians of a standardized curriculum and offer themselves up 
to pedagogies of difference, responsiveness, and uncertainty.  Thus, classrooms where 
 134 
discomfort is embraced as transformative become “spaces of intellectual and persona 
discovery as we explore the ways in which identity can ground and trouble us and seek to 
understand how we come to know what we think we know about ourselves and others” 
(Brueggemann and Moddelmog, 2003, p. 216). 
Context 
Constructing these spaces for dialogue and discovery leads us also to consider 
context. If we take seriously Restak’s (2003) claim that “the plasticity of our brains” 
responds to our techno-cultural context by changing the way it is operates, then we 
understand that our context, be it the classroom or another location beyond the school 
campus, is an extension of who we are and how we work in that setting.  A reflexive 
concept of context, or space, is illustrated in Freire’s (1996) discussion of educational 
space, in which he suggests, “We need to associate our workspace with certain qualities 
that are extensions of ourselves. We make a space that will either remake us or will help 
us accomplish our tasks. It is in this sense that what may seem circumstantial, mere 
accessory in the educational space, ends up becoming as essential as the space itself” (p. 
123).  I envision the reflexive classroom as thriving, dynamic space that celebrates 
discovery and incites curiosity.  Such a classroom resonates with Ayers (2001) vision of a 
liberated curriculum: one in which students are experiencing discovery and surprise, 
engaging with primary sources and hands-on materials that they can experience 
affectively rather than sanitized texts, creating, questioning, and confronting real 
problems. 
The classroom also needs to appeal to the larger cultural contexts of the learners 
and must be, like the curriculum, labile so that new arrangements and technologies 
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(multi-age or interest grouping, experimentation, discussion, multi-media devices) can 
supplement student discovery as needed.   This space enters into the critical dialogue and 
is co-constructed by the community of learners in tandem with the lived curriculum.  As 
Friere (1996) suggests,  “A good starting point for the school year may be a discussion 
among educators and learners about their space and how to make it or maintain it as a 
happy and pleasant place. There is a necessary relationship between the educator's body, 
the learner's body, and the space in which they work. No living body fails to experience 
its space” (p. 123). 
 In addition to considering the way we collaboratively construct the classroom 
environment, we can also bring context into the critical dialogue in other meaningful 
ways.  We can recognize our affective investments in mass digital popular culture and 
offer multiple readings – “seek out those voices that do not fit our world view or our 
readings of popular culture texts” – in order to reconstruct our understandings of bodies, 
and difference, and schooling (Daspit and Weaver, 2000, p. xix).  We can allow popular 
culture to raise important, and often, uncomfortable questions about the prevailing 
educational narratives that have operated to objectify, diagnose and exclude particular 
bodies. 
We can also bring popular/political/personal context into our critical 
conversations.  I return to the Webber’s (2003) observation of the way we tend to 
approach the problems that arise in schools: What are we going to do about this problem?  
This question is indicative of a doing to strategy rather than the reflexive working with 
approach.   When, through our critical conversations, we confront the problems that will 
arise as we attempt to co-operatively negotiate the curriculum, we can honor context by 
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asking instead, “Why is this happening now, to whom, and in what setting?” (Webber, 
2003, p. 193).  In this way, when we confront issues such as disengagement, difference 
and discontent, we can avoid wasting our time with quick-fix solutions like the measures 
enacted to address school violence.  As Noddings (2005) explains, the official response to 
the series of highly publicized school shootings in the 1990s was “more surveillance 
cameras, more security guards, better metal detectors, more locks, shorter lunch periods, 
more rules,” all of which failed to create safer schools (p. 13).   As Noddings  (2005) 
suggests, we should have been asking “why there has been a decline in security and how 
we should address the problem.  Do we need more prisonlike measures, or is something 
fundamentally wrong with the entire school arrangement?” (p. 13).  Such questions, 
questions that require us look beyond the “quick fixes” that address only the symptoms of 
a disembodied curriculum, honor the techno-cultural contexts of our students and allow 
us to respond in more personal and meaningful ways.  These are the kinds of questions 
reflexive learners can confront through dialogue. 
Prosthesis 
 We cannot consider “context” without recognizing the posthuman condition.  To 
say that we are posthuman is to recognize that our existence in the world is undeniably 
mediated by technology, that we achieve what we perceive as “normalcy” only through 
our complex interactions with techno-scientific interventions.  In the digital age, the era 
of nanotechnology, prostheses are no longer simply artificial body parts like arms, legs 
and breast implants, but other extensions of our bodies that supplement the limitations of 
the physical body and alter our affective perceptions:  psychotropic drugs, virtual reality, 
the internet, digital images, cell phones, iPods, and more.  As Weaver (2005) suggests, 
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“We can no longer see prosthetics as alien appendages to our bodies but things that are 
melded onto and into our bodies and as a result enable us to feel, see, hear, and smell the 
world differently”  (p. 84).  In the context of posthuman life, a reflexive pedagogy must 
operate as a prosthetic, an outward extension of ourselves, that allows us to experience 
the world differently. Confronted with our plasticity, with the idea that technology is not 
separate but part of our bodies, we need to expose our discursive and affective evolutions 
through dialogue.  Weaver (2005) asserts that we have many questions to consider:   
How are pharmaceuticals, cosmetic surgery, gene therapy, stem cell research, 
performance enhancement drugs, cloning, and just simple interactive video games 
and virtual reality changing our bodies?  How are our capabilities enhanced as 
athletes and scholars? What is the price for this enhancement or how does 
technology as a supplement alter our bodies psychologically and physiologically? 
How does the post human condition reconfigure such notions as natural and 
artificial?  Are these terms even relevant since they now blur together? Does a 
natural body now constitute an underprivileged body? (Weaver, 2005, p. 91-92). 
Indeed, as Weaver (2005) suggests here, we have many important and potentially 
uncomfortable questions to consider: when and how do we bring our sometimes “secret” 
cyborgism – including our optional “enhancements” – into the critical dialogue?  How 
could disclosing our own embodied understandings change the way we think about 
normalcy, that elusive condition that often drives our prosthetic engagements? We cannot 
meaningfully consider context in reflexive pedagogies without confronting these issues of 
posthuman bodies and negotiating through social relations new ways of prosthetic 
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understanding, and we can seek to do so through these interwoven, reflexive elements of 
embodied pedagogies. 
The elements I have explored here – disclosure, lability, dialogue, discomfort, 
context, and prosthesis – are some of the ways that I envision reflexive pedagogies 
emerging from the rhetorical morass of “no child left” standards, sanctions, and 
accountability.  Perhaps it is logically untenable to envision a future in which different 
schools construct and adopt different learning goals and standards that are meaningful 
and personal for their particular knowing-bodies, but that does not give us license to 
abandon embodied pedagogy altogether.  Rather, I believe that in the current climate of 
high-stakes minimum competency accountability, it is more important than ever that we 
seek ways to bring public education into the realm of the intimate, the personal, the 
pleasurable, the affective. We must do this if we hope to make the marginalizing, 
categorizing, alienating, dehumanizing institution that public education has become into 
something liberating, meaningful, and promising. 
As I look toward a reconceptualization of the curriculum and the body, I want 
express the urgency of our task by bringing up the question posed by William Ayers 
(2001):   
When we teachers look out over our classrooms, what do we see? Half-civilized 
barbarians? Savages? A collection of deficits, or IQs, or averages?  Do we see 
fellow creatures? We see students in our classrooms, of course, but who are they? 
What hopes do they bring? What is the language of their dreams? What 
experiences have they had, and where do they want to go? What interests or 
concerns them, how have they been hurt, what are they frightened of, what will 
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they fight for, and what and whom do they care about?  What is their bliss? Their 
pain? (p. 56).     
Do we see a community of learners who come to us already inscribed in language, 
already in need of critical dialogue?  Do we see flesh and blood children, fellow 
creatures, full with questions, confusions, needs and desires?  Or do we see a spreadsheet 
of deficits and liabilities?  Can we, as teachers, really give our students, our children, our 
future, what they deserve, what so many of us long to give them, when we are caught in 
the gaze of accountability at every turn?  Have our perceptions of teaching and learning, 
our affective investments in the educational process, been clouded by the rhetoric of 
standards and accountability?  Can we stomach the blatant injustices, the labels and 
pathologies, written on the bodies of our children in the name of achievement?  How 
many millions of children must we diagnose, other, exclude, and medicate before we 
realize that we have been asking the wrong questions?  Davis (2002) contends that:  
Only when the veil is torn from the bland face of the average, only when the 
hidden political and social injuries are revealed behind the mask of benevolence, 
only when the hazardous environment designed to be the comfort zone of the 
normal is shown with all its pitfalls and traps that create disability – only then will 
we begin to face and feel each other in all that rich variety and difference of our 
bodies, our minds, and our outlooks (Davis, 170). 
In order to redefine difference and bring bodies fully into our classrooms and curricula, 
into the “comfort zone of the normal,” we have to confront our seriously misguided 
assumptions about assessment, accountability, and academic performance.  We have to 
ask ourselves what parents want their child to be seen merely as a collection of deficits to 
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be filled before a test time, or a “sure bet” that can be left to his own vices, or a “lost 
cause” that is abandoned to the isolation of a resource room?  What child doesn’t deserve 
to be “seen” in the classroom, embraced, celebrated, for all of the messy, complicated 
idiosyncrasies that make every child extraordinary?  Ultimately, we will have to decide 
what the standardization, the efficient measurement of “Adequate Yearly Progress” is 
worth to us. Until then, we have to seek out ways to keep hope, and our inquiring 
subjectivities, alive. 
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